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The Littoral Combat Ship’s (LCS) minimally manned core 
crew goal is 15 to 50 manpower requirements and the 
threshold, for both core and mission-package crews, is 75 
to 110.  This dramatically smaller crew size will require 
more than current technologies and past lessons learned 
from reduced manning initiatives.  Its feasibility depends 
upon changes in policy and operations, leveraging of future 
technologies and increased Workload Transfer from sea to 
shore along with an increased acceptance of risk.   
 A manpower requirements analysis yielded a large 
baseline (~200) requirement to support a notional LCS 
configuration.  Combining the common systems from the 
General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin designs with other 
assumed equipments (i.e. the combined diesel and gas 
turbine (CODAG) engineering plant) produce the notional LCS 
configuration used as the manpower requirements basis.  The 
baseline requirement was reduced through the compounded 
effect of manpower savings from Smart Ship and OME and 
suggested paradigm shifts.  A Battle Bill was then created 
to support the notional LCS during Conditions of Readiness 
I and III.   
An efficient force deployment regime was adopted to 
reduce the overall LCS class manpower requirement.  The 
efficiency gained enables the LCS force to “flex” and 
satisfy deployment requirements with 25% to 30% fewer 
manpower requirements over the “one-for-one” crewing 
concept.  An annual manpower savings of $80M to $110M if 
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The Navy’s new LCS, with many novel approaches to ship 
design and operations, will consist of a hull (or seaframe) 
that is augmented with either an MIW, ASW, or SUW focused 
mission module –– with the mission modules rapidly 
interchangeable to allow the LCS to operate across a broad 
spectrum of conflict.  For operational flexibility, the 
Navy plans 119 modules to support 56 seaframes. 
To keep operating costs low, the LCS (seaframe plus 
module) is promised to operate with “minimal manning” – 
originally specified at 75.  Questioning the viability of 
this number, we estimated LCS manning requirements and 
concluded that if the Navy pursued “business as usual”, the 
crew would be far larger than 75.  Past reduced manning 
initiatives like Smart Ship and Fleet Optimal Manning 
Experiments will not be enough.  A set of “paradigm shifts” 
were then explored to further reduce the manpower 
requirements.  Each requirement was analyzed for impact 
from Navy policy, technology leverage and workload 
management.  Even with these new business practices with 
associated manpower requirement estimates (~45 for 
seaframe, ~55 for MIW module, ~50 for ASW module, and ~45 
for SUW module) the totals sum to about 90-100 manpower 
requirements, or 15-25 more than the original threshold of 
75. 
Lastly, because more modules need to be deployable 
than will actually be deployed – e.g., about 32 deployable 
for 15 deployed – options for organizing the “module 
squadron” personnel were considered to avoid potential 
 xvi
waste of valuable human capital.  Observing that there are 
many similar systems among the different warfare modules, 
we analyzed ways to de-link the module personnel from the 
packaged module systems, so that many of the same personnel 
could quickly flex from one warfare module to another.  
This flexible approach has the potential to reduce the 









1I. INTRODUCTION  
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) along with the DD(X) 
and CG(X) is among the first of the 21st century combatant 
ships to be acquired by the United States Navy.  The LCS 
program is an aggressive acquisition program that started 
in FY03 with the first Flight 0 ships scheduled for 
delivery in 2007.   
The LCS adopts a unique modular concept for operations 
in the littorals.  The concept begins with a seaframe 
augmented with a mission package to produce a focused 
mission LCS in one of the three littoral warfare areas.  
The seaframe itself has some inherent self-defense 
capabilities that do not equate to a particular warfare 
area.  To conduct operations in a particular littoral 
warfare area, the LCS seaframe is complimented with a 
mission package for either mine warfare (MIW), anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), or surface warfare (SUW).  The 
mission package consists of transportable focused mission 
package (FMP) modules and their pack-up kits (PUK). 
Overall, the LCS program plans to acquire 56 seaframes 
and 119 FMPs, designed to be rapidly changed to allow the 
LCS to quickly adapt to new missions.  If 15 LCS were 
deployed at a given time, this suggests that about 32 FMPs 
would be deployable at the same time. 
Each FMP module has specific hardware, software and 
manpower requirements (RQMTS) to conduct operations in a 
particular littoral warfare area.  The modules will include 
one H-60 series helicopter, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs) as well as sensors and weapons 
2for these vehicles.  With the sensor and weapon systems 
onboard, the unmanned vehicles (UVs) will be employed on an 
unprecedented scale as the littoral combat ship’s principal 
extended sensor and weapon delivery vehicles.   
Figure 1 depicts the components of a warfare focused 
LCS.  For example, the MIW focused LCS is the augmentation 
of the seaframe with the MIW package.  Note that the 
warfare package also includes a crew of about 95, if the 
Navy adopted its legacy approach to manning this module.  
When the manning requirements for a package are combined 
with the manning requirements for the seaframe, the total 
MIW focused LCS manning would then be approximately 215.  
Similar estimates apply to the ASW focused LCS with manning 
around 210, and the SUW which has about 195.  Overall, the 
average manning for the warfare focused LCS would be about 
207.   
 
Figure 1.   LCS Modular Approach 
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3This level of manning is judged to be too large, and 
so the LCS program is aggressively pursuing minimally 
manned seaframes and FMPs – the minimum required to 
accomplish the mission.  To assist in this goal, the crews 
will be supported by “just-in time training, distance 
learning, distant support and maintenance.”  LCS will not 
have “the wide variety of skills necessary to maintain all 
shipboard equipment.”[Ref 1] 
The LCS seaframe crew (called the core crew) is 
expected to operate the seaframe and installed systems, 
while the FMP crew (called the mission-package crew) will 
operate and maintain FMP vehicles, systems, sensors and 
weapons.  Both the core and mission-package crews are to 
interface with one another through common open system 
architecture. 
Through Spiral Development, LCS ships will: 
Leverage automation, “smart systems,” and human 
systems integration principles in engineering, 
damage control, combat systems, ship control, 
messing, and other ship systems tied into an 
extensive local area network to optimize and 
integrate the capabilities of the ship and core 
crew. [Ref 1: pg 42] 
 
Furthermore, crew knowledge, skills and abilities 
(KSA) are expected to be refined and enhanced through Human 
Factors Engineering developments like the “expert agent” 















Legacy Ship Manpower Documents (SMDs) manpower 
requirements are determined by, but are not limited to, the 
following development elements [Ref 5]: 
1. Required Operational Capability and Projected 
Operational Environment (ROC/POE) parameters and 
analysis, 
2. Directed manpower requirements (Master Chief 
Petty Officer of the Command, Safety, Career 
Counselor, etc.), 
3. Watch stations, 
4. Preventive Maintenance, 
5. Corrective Maintenance, 
6. Facilities Maintenance, 
7. Application approved staffing standards (when 
applicable), 
8. On-site workload measurement and analysis, 
9. Utility tasking (underway replenishment, flight 
operations, sea and anchor detail, etc.), 
10. Allowances (service diversions, productivity 
allowance, etc.), 
11. Development of officer requirements, and 
12. Fleet review of draft documents. 
 
The most critical element in developing manpower 
documents is the ROC/POE document.  The ROC provides a 
precise definition of the unit’s mission statement.  The 
POE is a description of the specific operating environment 
in which the unit is expected to operate [Ref 5].  The 
ROC/POE for LCS is still in the development phase, and was 
6not available to support this study.  For this reason, part 
of the thesis research was aimed at deriving a 
representative ROC/POE. 
The Navy’s at-sea workload is another key element used 
in calculating manpower requirements.  The workload is 
computed on a workweek with 168 hours.  Of the 168 hours, 
only 81 hours are available for duty or work.  The 81 hours 
include 70 hours of Productive work, 7 hours of Training 
and 4 hours of Service Diversion.  Table 1 summarizes the 
workweek hours for at-sea. The workload is different for 
“shore-based deployable units” [Ref 5]. 
 
Table 1.   Navy Afloat (Wartime) Workweek For Military 
Personnel (From Ref 4) 
Category Hours
Non-Available Time   
Sleep 56 
Messing 14 
Personal Needs 14 
Sunday Free 3 
Available Time  
Training 7 
Service Diversion 4 
Productive Work 70 
Total Hours Available Weekly 168 
 
Unlike the LCS seaframe, the FMP modules will be 
“shore-based deployable units.”  The module RQMTS will be 
defined in the Fleet Manpower Document (FMD) similar to the 
SMD.   
From the manpower perspective, the Navy’s most 
demanding requirements (RQMTS) are at sea during Condition 
7of Readiness I (Battle Readiness) for 24 hours and 
Condition of Readiness III (wartime/increased tension or 
forward deployed cruising readiness) for 60 days with 
opportunity for 8 hours of rest provided per [person] per 
day [Ref 5].  
While in Condition I, the ship must be capable of 
meeting the following criteria:  
 
1. Able to perform all offensive and defensive 
functions simultaneously, 
2. Able to keep all installed systems manned and 
operating for maximum effectiveness, 
3. Required to accomplish only minimal maintenance - 
that routinely associated with watch standing and 
urgent repairs, 
4. Perform self-defense measures, and 
5. Evolutions such as replenishment, law enforcement 
or [helicopter] operations are not appropriate 
unless the evolution stations are co-manned by 
manpower from other battle stations.   
 
Condition III requires reduced defensive systems and 
manning to a level sufficient to counter pop-up threats.  
While in Condition III, the ship must be capable of meeting 
the following criteria:  
1. Able to keep installed systems manned and 
operating as necessary to conform with 
prescribed ROCs, and 
2. Able to accomplish all normal underway 
maintenance, support and administrative 
functions. 
 
8All new ship (i.e., LCS seaframe) and aircraft (i.e., 
RQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV) acquisitions must be supported by 
the development of their manpower documents to determine 
the initial RQMTS.  The Program Manager is responsible for 
developing these documents using the Navy Manpower 
Requirements System (NMRS) maintained by NAVMAC.  
 Numerous past studies and experiments have examined 
the feasibility and effectiveness of reduced manning, 
although not specifically focused on LCS.  One of the 
studies, the Surface Combatant of the 21st Century (SC-21) 
Manning Reduction Initiatives [Ref 8], evaluated the 
potential for minimal manning (95 personnel in that case) 
and concluded: 
1. Reduced manning is feasible if technological 
advances are realized,  
2. Ships lose multi-warfare depth with 95-man 
crew,  
3. Incorporating moderate-risk technology can 
effect significant manning reductions (45%), 
4. We still have unresolved issues (e.g., shore 
infrastructure), 
5. Tradeoffs between minimum manning, quality of 
life, and mission efficiency must be carefully 
weighed, and 
6. We need an activity to lead/coordinate the 
manning effort. 
 
However, the bottom line recommendation from that study was 
to proceed cautiously concluding that a crew of 170 is more 
achievable than a crew of 95 for the SC-21 family of ships. 
9Another study, Optimal Manning and Technological 
Change [Ref 7], evaluated “future trends in naval 
technology and in civilian labor forces” and concluded: 
1. Technological advances will probably require a 
more skilled, rather than less skilled, 
workforce,   
2. Also, the Navy must use care in automating 
warfighting because routine peacetime tasks can 
be automated more easily than inherently 
chaotic and complex combat evolutions, 
3. Skills of the Navy’s enlisted force will change 
markedly as familiar tasks are automated and 
workload moves from operational units to the 
infrastructure, 
4. Sailors will need new, or different, skills to 
support collaboration between human and 
machine, introduction of more COTS technology, 
and the development of generalists rather than 
specialists, 
5. Damage Control is more difficult to automate 
because of unpredictable requirements, and 
6. Future sailors will understand the general 
principles in their areas of expertise, will be 
technically literate, and have strong problem-
solving, decision-making, and communication 
skills. 
 
Reduced manning experiments like the “Smart Ship” 
program on USS Yorktown (CG-48) and USS Rushmore (LSD-47) 
and the Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment on USS MILIUS 
(DDG-69), USS Mobile Bay (CG-51) and USS Boxer (LHD-4) were 
efforts designed to test Navy culture and technology to 
10
reduce the manpower requirements. The Smart Ship experiment 
successfully introduced seven systems that have the 
potential to produce significant reductions in manning.  
However, “technology [alone] did not produce a reasonable 
return on investment. [T]he technologies were critical to 
the policy and procedural changes” [Ref 9]. 
Fleet Manning Experiments (FME) or Optimal Manning 
Experiments (OME) successfully reduced manning through 
policy and operational changes with minimal technology 
installs.  The administrative functions were relocated 
ashore to the Pay and Personnel Ashore (PAPA) detachments.  
This removed most of the administrative personnel leaving 
only the minimum to help coordinate ship’s force with the 
PAPA detachment.  Regarding optimal manning, VADM LaFleur 
writes: 
Optimal manning works. We will apply what we 
learn in these experiments--both to our current 
force, and to sizing the force of the future--to 
more efficiently man our ships and reinvest the 
resultant manpower savings into the type of 
transformational technologies required for our 
21st-century force [Ref 11].   
 
Another attempt to reduce manning involved the Oliver 
Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates and the Consolidated 
Maintenance Package (CMP).  The FFG-7 was originally 
designed to operate with minimal manning.  The concept was 
supported by a consolidated maintenance package designed to 
reduce the ship’s maintenance requirements and replace 
critical parts before at regular intervals regardless of 
their status.  This reduced manning attempt suffered a 
setback when budget constraints forced CMP workload back 
onboard and removed the critical parts replacement plan.  
This setback ultimately increased the FFG’s RQMTS which 
11
increased berthing requirements and removed crew lounges.  
The overall effect was a decreased quality of life for 
those onboard.  The failure of the FFG-7 minimal manning 
project was due to the lack of understanding of the 
integration of the manpower requirements, acquisition, 
design capabilities and maintenance process, in short, a 
failure of human system integration. 
DOD transformation efforts and an increasingly 
squeezed budget have now produced an environment where 
minimal manning is a necessity, perhaps accelerating its 
realization.  Transformation calls for changes in how the 
U.S. Navy has been doing business and allocating limited 
resources.  One of the biggest cost drivers for the Navy is 
the cost of manpower.  The Navy can no longer afford to 
make manpower considerations an afterthought to system 
design.  A less-flexible budget coupled with increasing 
personnel cost have raised the importance of manpower 
considerations throughout the system acquisition process.  
If minimal manning is to be a reality, the U.S. Navy must 
also change its manpower requirements determination 
philosophy and emphasize manpower and human factors 
implications throughout the acquisition process. 
Skilled manpower is an indispensable factor in 
the successful deployment of new ships, aircraft, 
equipment, and most other new hardware systems.  
The human element must be an integral part of 
system design and logistic support at the 
earliest acquisition phase.  Although there is 
considerable uncertainty early in the acquisition 
process, every effort shall be made to use the 
best available data and techniques in developing 
manpower estimates.  These estimates shall be 
continuously refined, as the system progresses, 
to form the basis for operational and maintenance 
manpower requirements’ descriptions, personnel 
selection and training, training devices and 
12
simulator design, and other planning related to 
MPT.  NAVMAC will review and compare these 
estimates with current manpower requirements 
associated with similar existing systems, and for 
consistency with applicable MPT policies [Ref 5].  
13
III. PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE 
A. PROBLEM 
The seaframe and module manpower requirements (RQMTS) 
for LCS are highly constrained by the crew accommodation 
threshold.  The LCS critical design parameter for manning 
is of particular interest.  In the preliminary requirements 
document, the combined (seaframe plus mission module) RQMTS 
is limited by the threshold of 75 [Ref 2].  
 Since the release of the critical design document 
(CDD) in May 2004, the crew accommodation threshold has 
been increased to 110, reflecting the difficulty of the 
manning problem.  This increase added 35 additional bunks, 
and has eased the constraint for the combined manpower 
requirements considerably.  However, this relaxed threshold 
remains much lower than legacy RQMTS, and is still a 
significant challenge.  Addressing this challenge is the 
problem at hand. 
 
B.  OBJECTIVE 
This study has two objectives.  The first objective is 
to determine the aggressiveness of the different approaches 
to achieve the specified manning levels.  The baseline, or 
“business as usual”, estimates were derived using a 
methodology similar to the NMRS used to determine new 
construction RQMTS.  This approach is not as aggressive in 
looking for ways to reduce the RQMTS or to efficiently 
manage the personnel.  Because of this, we looked carefully 
at reduced manning initiatives, as well as to evaluate some 
“paradigm shifts” that would cause the Navy to 
significantly change its manning practices. 
14
   The second objective is to evaluate options for 
organizing the module personnel.  Because there are many 
more modules than seaframes (119 modules for 56 seaframes, 
or perhaps 32 deployable modules for 15 deployed 
seaframes), the assignment of one crew per FMP module would 
equate to a very large, and very inefficient, LCS force.   
 Two concepts of mission-package personnel management 
were evaluated: “pre-packaged” and “flexed”.  The “pre-
packaged” concept is the assignment of one crew per module, 
much as the Navy assigns personnel to ships.  The “flexed” 
alternative is the collection of all personnel into a 
single pool, and then organized into generalist and 
specialist detachments.  The module RQMTS are then 
satisfied with the assignment of the detachments as they 
are needed.     
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IV. ASSUMPTIONS 
Because most of the LCS program remains in the 
development stages, the data required for this analysis is 
very limited or restricted.  Numerous assumptions were 
therefore made to help frame this manpower requirements 
analysis. 
For both the seaframe and modules, the appropriate 
manpower requirement is the number needed to support the 
most demanding notional ROC/POE requirements during 
Condition I and III for 24-hours and 60 days respectively. 
 
A. NOTIONAL LCS SEAFRAME 
 There are currently two competing shipbuilding teams 
(General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin), and the actual 
configuration details for both team’s LCS designs are still 
proprietary.  In view of that, this study used information 
that was publicly available to approximate the two designs, 
from which a composite “notional” seaframe was developed.  
 However the information available does not include the 
engineering plant and other critical items like the 
aircraft handling and UV launch and recovery systems.  
Based upon the assumption that LCS is to operate 
efficiently at both high and low speeds in shallow water, a 
combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) with water jet 
propulsion was assumed.   
 Other equipment added includes a common unmanned 
vehicle launch and recovery system as well as aircraft 
handling systems on the flight deck.  Table 2 summarizes 


















AMS CMS AMS CMS
Gun System Bofors 57mm Bofors 57mm 57mm BOFORS
CIWS CIWS 1B
Low caliber gun .50 cal (4) .50 cal (4) .50 cal (4)
Missile System RAM RAM RAM







SONAR Retractable Mine Sonar
Retractable Mine 
Avoidance SONAR












Air Decoy SRBOC (6)    NULKA(4)




The seaframe’s organization was assumed to be similar 
to the five legacy ships used in this study.  The legacy 
ships are the CG, DDG, FFG, MCM and MHC classes, and were 
chosen as “proxies” for some of the LCS functions because 
the seaframe, for the most part, will have the same 
shipboard organization and regulations.  Their systems and 
RQMTS have proven their effectiveness through countless 
missions accomplished.  Therefore, their configuration will 
be used as the basis to estimate or approximate the RQMTS 
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for the notional LCS system. Each ship, including the 
assumed LCS seaframe, is organized into five departments: 
1. Executive, 
2. Operations, 
3. Combat Systems, 
4. Engineering, and 
5. Supply. 
The LCS seaframe Executive Department is akin to 
legacy executive departments consisting of the commanding 
and executive officers as well as administrative support.  
The executive department’s administrative functions are 
greatly supported by the advances of the Pay and Personnel 
Ashore (PAPA) detachment.  The PAPA detachment is a concept 
that has proven to be a key element of Fleet Manning 
Experiments like Optimal Manning Experiments (OME).  With 
this detachment ashore, most of the administrative, pay and 
personnel functions have been transferred off the ship. 
The LCS seaframe Operations Department is similar to 
the operations department of single mission ships like the 
MCM and MHC ships although the LCS seaframe will be 
equipped with bigger guns and missiles.  It is assumed that 
the RQMTS from these single-mission ships can be translated 
into the RQMTS to support the focused-mission LCS.  
Additionally, the LCS RQMTS will be divided between the 
seaframe and module.  The module will bring onboard 
additional personnel to support operations in the 
individual warfare areas. 
The LCS seaframe Combat Systems Department is 
different from legacy Combat Systems Department because the 
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systems themselves are somewhat but not entirely different.  
See Table 3 for the LCS systems and the closest legacy 
system.  These legacy systems will be used as proxies for 
the LCS system that is emerging or does not yet exist. 
 
Table 3.   LCS Seaframe System and Proxy 
System Proxy
57mm BOFORS 5/54 gun
CIWS Actual




Torpedo Decoy Launcher SVTT
Mine Avoidance SONAR SQS-53C  
 
 Therefore, it is assumed that the notional LCS systems 
the represent, will have the same manpower requirements as 
the legacy system.  For example, the legacy RAM system has 
manpower requirements of less than one.  It is assumed that 
the RAM system on the notional LCS will also have manpower 
requirements less than one.   
 The LCS seaframe Engineering Department with the CODAG 
design is assumed to be similar to the most demanding 
legacy gas turbine designs.  All legacy gas turbine ships 
will be potential proxies for the assumed LCS.  However, 
all the legacy engineering plants are of a single 
configuration (i.e., either gas turbine or diesel main 
propulsion engines).  Therefore, it is further assumed that 
legacy ships with diesel engineman (EN) RQMTS are a better 
proxy than those without EN.  The auxiliary diesel 
19
mechanics are further assumed to be capable of working on 
main diesel engines after proper training. 
 The LCS seaframe Supply Department is similar to the 
legacy Supply Departments using all available advances in 
technology to allow electronic disbursing and the PAPA 
detachment supported functions.  
 
B. BATTLE BILL 
The most demanding manpower requirements are during 
Conditions I and III for 24-hours and 60 days respectively.  
The Operational Manning is the requirement driver for 
supporting these conditions of readiness.   
The battle bill delineates the watch stations required 
to support the different control stations to satisfy the 
requirements of the Required Operational Capabilities and 
Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) documents.  
There are eight control stations common to all legacy 
ships: 
1. ship control, 
2. communication control, 
3. operations control, 
4. combat system casualty control, 
5. weapons control, 
6. engineering control, 
7. damage control, and 
8. support control. 
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 It is assumed that the LCS will share these common 
control stations.  Additionally, these control stations 
will be supported with technology similar to the seven core 
Smart Ship systems (e.g., Integrated Bridge System and 
Machinery Control System). 
 The Smart Ship project on USS Yorktown successfully 
completed numerous demanding assessments, and all concluded 
that Yorktown “performed consistently well”.  Yorktown, 
with the installed Smart Ship technologies, revised policy 
and procedures and improved maintenance methods, was 
assessed by NAVMAC and OPTEVFOR.  Both concluded that 
Yorktown was able to satisfy all the ROC/POE requirements 
[Ref 9].     
 It is assumed that the favorable assessments and 
successful completion of a Counter-Narcotics deployment 
immediately afterwards have rendered the Smart Ship 
technologies as effective.  These systems, along with the 
revised policy and maintenance procedures, are assumed to 
be reliable for unrestricted use onboard the LCS seaframe 
and FMP modules. 
 OME for USS Milius reduced its RQMTS by changing 
policy and operational procedures with limited technology 
installs.  The successful completion of OME was determined 
by the ship’s performance throughout the Inter-Deployment 
and Training Cycle (IDTC) and mission accomplishment during 
deployment.  USS Milius successfully completed all 
assessments and the deployment immediately following the 
experiment with the reduced manning.   
 It is assumed that the success of the USS Milius has 
paved the way for OME philosophies and methodology for the 
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LCS.  One of the key elements of OME was the PAPA 
detachment conducting supporting a majority of the ship’s 
routine administrative functions ashore.  It is further 
assumed that LCS administrative functions will also be 
supported by a PAPA detachment. 
The composition concept was also used frequently to 
change the watch standing philosophies during the reduced 
manning experiments.  For example, the DDG had two RQMTS 
for a NIXIE Operator and a NIXIE Repairman before the 
experiment.  After OME, the DDG required only one NIXIE 
Operator/Repairman.  The concept assumes that the workload 
for both the NIXIE Operator and Repairman was able to be 
reduced by 50%.  Table 4 lists some of the legacy 
compositions from the DDG OME.  The LCS composition 
concept, based upon the DDG NIXIE RQMTS, will also assume 
the workload of two RQMTS can be reduced by 50%.  For 
example, the LCS EN who has been trained to do the GSM 
function will be required to support only 50% of both the 
EN and GSM workload.   
Furthermore, the composition of the operator and 
repairman has enabled greater flexibility of operational 
personnel.  The operator has the skills required to adjust 
the system to operational requirements without minimal 
outside assistance.  However, the system operator will be 
the system maintainer while the operator is not standing 
watch.  The further necessitates the requirement to reduce 
the administrative workload for the operator/repairman or 






Table 4.   Legacy Compositions From DDG OME               
(From Refs 8-9) 












The Composite Sailor concept is both a policy and 
operational change item.  This concept not only allows the 
combination of watch stations, it also allows the 
combination of the rates and functions. For example, a 
diesel mechanic (engineman or EN rate) who is assigned to 
the LCS will also be trained to work on gas turbine engines 
similar to the gas turbine mechanical (GSM) rate.  Rates 
with similar job descriptions onboard the LCS were 
considered for composition.  These rates include, but are 
not limited to these ratings: BM, CTT, DC, EN, ET, GS, HT, 
MM, MR, OS, QM, STG and TM.  See Appendix O for rate 







Table 5.   Suggested Rate Combination 
Legacy Rate LCS Rate
BM, EN, MM and QM BM 
CTT, ET ET 
DC, HT, MR DC 
EN, GS EN/GS 
OS, QM OS 
STG, TM STG 
 
The LCS Boatswain’s Mate (BM) rate will consist of 
KSAs from the Engineman (EN), Machinist’s Mate (MM) and 
Quartermaster (QM) rates.  Small boat coxswains have 
traditionally been the BMs.  When a small boat is deployed, 
it is required to have an EN rate onboard.  Since BMs are 
capable of maintaining deck machinery, it is assumed that 
BMs can also maintain the small boat engines of which they 
are the coxswain.  Similarly, the EN rate should also be 
able to perform duties as the small boat coxswain.  On the 
bridge, BMs have traditionally stood the watch as the 
Boatswain’s Mate of the watch (BMOW).  Today, they are 
standing watch as the Officer of the Deck (OOD) and Junior 
Officer of the Deck (JOOD) during Condition III operations.  
It is assumed that they are now capable of carrying out the 
duties as the navigator as well when on the bridge, thus 
removing the requirement for the QM. 
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Cryptologic Technician, Technical (CTTs) are “advanced 
[Electronic Technicians (ETs)] who do wiring, circuit 
testing and repair. They determine performance levels of 
electronic equipment, install new components, modify 
existing equipment and test, adjust and repair equipment 
cooling systems [Ref 6]”.  Under the assumption that ETs 
are able to perform these advanced functions, the ETs will 
replace the CTT RQMTS. 
The engineering rates of Damage Controlman (DC), Hull 
Maintenance Technician (HT) and Machinery Repairman (MR) 
are very similar.  Thus, the LCS DC rate will possess the 
KSAs from the HT and MR rate.  The DC knowledge of damage 
control can be greatly advanced with the skills of the HT 
and MR. 
In general, The Operations Specialist (OS) rate is 
responsible for managing secondary charts and performing 
radar navigation in support of the QM who performs the 
visual navigation.  These two rates are similar, using GPS 
data to update their positions.  The voyage management 
system (VMS) is capable of updating positions as well as 
voyage planning using GPS and radar inputs and steering the 
ship along the planned tracks.  Thus, it is assumed the QM 
rating can be replaced by the VMS and watchstanders in the 
piloting control stations and supported by the OS in CIC.  
This also assumes digital charts and permanent electronic 
recording of ship’s movement are acceptable in lieu of 
hardcopy charts, and the VMS along with the ECDIS are 
authorized for unrestricted use. 
The LCS SONAR Technician (Surface) (STG) rate will 
possess the KSAs of both the STG and the Torpedoman’s Mate 
(TM).  For LCS, the TMs are required for torpedo 
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countermeasures.  By extending the ordnance capability to 
the STG rate, the torpedo countermeasures can be covered by 
the STG. 
 
1. Ship Control  
With respect to ship control, it is assumed that the 
Smart Ship Integrated Bridge System (IBS) and Voyage 
Management System (VMS) will have matured enough to reduce 
the LCS piloting control stations to just the OOD and JOOD 
watches.  Both the IBS and VMS systems would be integrated 
into the notional Integrated Command Centers (ICC). 
Furthermore, it is also assumed that the chart 
coverage provided by the VMS and Electronic Chart Display 
Information System (ECDIS) will be sufficient to require 
only minimal paper charts onboard the LCS.  If not, the 
Operations Specialist (OS) is assumed to be capable of 
preparing and managing the paper charts without the 
Quartermasters (QM).  Operations Specialists (OS) have 
consistently been the secondary navigation team supporting 
the Quartermasters (QM).  These skills combined with the 
VMS and IBS can be used to conduct all the LCS seaframe’s 
voyage planning requirements. 
The LCS bridge watchstanders will be the primary 
watchstanders responsible for the safe navigation of the 
ship.  Using the IBS, VMS and ECDIS systems, the Officer-
of-the-Deck (OOD) and Junior OOD will be able to receive 
real-time ship’s position and other pertinent navigation 
data to support their decision-making abilities. 
It is assumed that the LCS pilot house will give the 
bridge watchstanders the ability to see all around the 
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ship.  On the bridge with a 360-degree viewing capability, 
the LCS OOD and JOOD are able to safely navigate and handle 
the ship without additional lookouts. 
These Ship Control assumptions will allow the bridge 
watch stations to be reduced to just two.  The Officer of 
the Deck (OOD) and the Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) is 
assumed capable of safe ship operations with the IBS, VMS 
and an all-around viewing capability. 
 
2. Operations Control 
It is assumed that the LCS seaframe Combat Information 
Center (CIC) will incorporate the use of multi-modal 
consoles (MMC) along with an integrated Weapons Control 
Console (WCC).  The MMC is an emerging system that, in the 
interim, may require the use of legacy sensor and weapon 
consoles.  It is also assumed that the MMC will make 
available all the sensor inputs (e.g., Search RADAR, EO/IR, 
SLQ-32, etc.) to the watchstanders. 
Decoy controls are assume to be integrated into either 
the WCC or IBS console.  CIC watchstanders will have 
primary decoy (air, surface and underwater) controls with 
the secondary controls located in the pilot house’s IBS. 
Traditional CIC watches required watchstanders to 
operate stations predominantly dedicated to a single sensor 
or weapon system.  These Operations Control assumptions 
will consolidate most of the sensor inputs and weapon 
controls into a few consoles.  This will greatly reduce the 
number of watchstanders down to perhaps only two or three 
watchstanders using the MMC and WCC.  
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3. Communication Control 
It is assumed that the LCS Battle Bill Communication 
Control stations are similar to legacy Communication 
Control stations.  These watchstanders will maintain 
communication, tactical and LAN systems. 
The communication systems of legacy ships involved the 
use of many different circuits.  Most of these circuits had 
dedicated handsets which resulted in some difficulty in 
differentiation.  Onboard the LCS, it is assumed that these 
different circuits are patched into a common system where 
the executives and watchstanders will be able to access the 
different circuits with a visual aid to identify the status 
of the different circuits. 
Moreover, the LCS will leverage remote monitoring and 
sensing systems to reduce the manpower requirements for 
monitors.  The systems are assumed to replace legacy 
monitoring personnel (i.e., missile launcher monitors) thus 
allowing the system operators and casualty control 
personnel the ability to remote monitor all systems and 
respond as they are needed. 
Communications systems are greatly improved through 
advances in computing technology and commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) systems.  These improvements combined with the 
Smart Ship fiber optics LAN system, have greatly reduced 
the need for human monitors to check system performance and 
security.  With the ability to remotely monitor machinery 
and conditions, a dedicated monitor will not be required.  




4. Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control 
It is assumed that the LCS Battle Bill Combat 
Systems/Electronics Casualty Control stations are similar 
to legacy Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control 
stations where the RQMTS respond to combat system 
casualties as well as electronic system casualties.  
However, the assumed LCS will have personnel capable 
of operating and maintaining their systems.  This will 
greatly reduce the requirement for a separate operator and 
maintainer.  For example, the NIXIE system demonstrated 
that the requirements for a NIXIE Operator and NIXIE 
Repairman can be consolidated into a single NIXIE 
Operator/Maintainer. 
 
5. Weapons Control 
The 57MM, RAM, CIWS and decoy controls are assumed 
integrated into a single Weapons Control Console (WCC) 
console located in CIC with several back-up consoles 
located nearby.  Additionally, each weapon system will have 
the local control capability (i.e., CIWS will have an 
operator at the Local Control Panel).   
During Condition I, .50-caliber machine guns on the 
port and starboard sides will be manned and ready.  Each 
mount will require one operator and one ammo loader.  These 
personnel will also act as decoy loaders in support of the 
CIC watchstanders who are controlling the decoy launchers.  
The other two mounts will be augmented by standing down 
other watchstanders, and the ammo loader will support both 
mounts on their respective sides. 
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These assumptions will reduce the requirement for 
dedicated watch stations and systems.  By integrating more 
than one system into a console, the potential exists to 
reduce the watch-stander requirements.   
The seaframe crew is responsible for the safe 
launching and recovery of unmanned surface and underwater 
vehicles.  The assumed launch and recovery system is based 
upon an enlarged variant of the Swedish Visby corvette’s UV 
launch and recovery system.  The current U.S. Navy boat 
launching and recovery systems like the gravity davits 
found on legacy ships are manpower intensive.  The system 
proposed for LCS is the overhead rail system assisted with 
electrical winches and controls that spot the UVs to the 
launch/recovery station and then back its storage station.  
This system requires only one winch operator assisted by 
the personnel responsible for the UVs as tenders and 
assistants.  Thus, the boat launching and recovery 
apparatus onboard LCS may require only one operator. 
UAVs will be the responsibility of the aviation 
detachment personnel.  Aviation detachment personnel are 
responsible for the UAVs spot to the flight deck and then 
back to the hangar.  The seaframe crew will be responsible 
for the launch and recovery flight operations.   
 
6. Engineering Control 
The engineering plant is assumed to be of the combined 
diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) configuration.  The fuel 
efficiency of the diesel engine at slow speed and the power 
of the gas turbine engine at high speed make this 
propulsion system ideal for the LCS.  The engineers 
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assigned onboard LCS will not be watchstanders.  Their 
primary function is the maintenance and safe operation of 
the engineering plant and associated machinery.   
Engineers will assist the bridge watchstanders in the 
start-up and shut-down of engineering systems.  Bridge and 
CIC watchstanders will have the ability to remote start the 
main engines as well as auxiliary equipment from the bridge 
or CIC through the Machinery Control System accessible on 
the fiber optics LAN system.  This will allow the bridge 
and CIC watchstanders to control vital engineering 
equipments required to safely operate and fight the ship 
without degradation. 
During Condition III steaming, watchstanders are not 
required in the engineering spaces.  All engineers are 
maintainers during Condition III.  The EOOW and their 
assistant will be the watchstanders during Condition I with 
a monitor in the main engineroom.  This could reduce the 
LCS engineering watchstanders by 25% to 50% over the legacy 
engineering watches.   
The position of the JP5 Pump Room Operator is not 
required if it is able to be remotely operated from Central 
Control Station (CCS).  JP5 nozzleman will also have the 
redundant ability, from CCS, to start and stop the pumps 
from the flight deck area. 
 
7. Damage Control 
It is assumed that primary Damage Control Central 
(DCC) will be located in the Central Control Station (CCS), 
and secondary DCC will be remotely located on the bridge. 
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The damage control function relies on the extensive 
use of the Smart Ship Damage Control System (DCS) and 
installed shipboard firefighting technology that is 
available today.  For example, the installed AFFF and CO2 
systems inside critical spaces such as the main engineering 
and ordnance spaces.   
The Damage Control Officer (DCO) and Damage Control 
Assistant (DCA) will monitor and control damages from CCS 
while coordinating damage control efforts with the 
Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW).  To facilitate 
ease of communication and efficiency, the DCO, DCA and the 
damage control party will be co-located in the same space. 
The damage control party will be reduced commensurate 
with the acceptable risk level and technology leverage.  In 
general, the damage control party will consist of a scene 
leader, investigators, nozzleman and hoseman.  These will 
be the positions on the Rapid Response Team (RRT). 
The damage control philosophy is to engage the RRT to 
the scene immediately after the casualty.  The RRT will 
estimate the damage and augmentation required.  If the 
damage is beyond their capability, then the decision must 
be made whether or not to use the automation and installed 
firefighting system to isolate the damage.  This is 
important especially if the affected space is a critical 
space.  If the damage is too large for the RRT and the 
decision is made not to use the installed firefighting 
system, then additional personnel will be required by 
standing down watch stations that are deemed non essential 
to the operation at hand. 
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If the damage is excessively large for the augmented 
damage control party, then the decision must be made to 
either continue the operation until it is time to abandon 
or disengage from the operation. 
By changing the Damage Control philosophy, the legacy 
Damage Controls of 80 personnel can be reduced by 50% to 
75%. 
  
8. Support Control 
LCS seaframe Support Control is assumed to be the same 
in all respects as the legacy Support Control stations and 
their functions. 
The assumed LCS Supply Department is assumed to use 
advanced inventory systems like the scanners and commercial 
inventory management programs.  These technologies can 
reduce the amount of personnel required to locate and issue 
as well as the time required.  Another assumption is that 
the self-service food line function is capable of reducing 
the CS requirement by about 25% to 50%.   
 
C. AVIATION DETACHMENT 
The aviation detachment manpower requirement (RQMTS) 
is based upon the NAVAIR 1.2 LCS Alternative Aviation 
Support Study for the MH-60R/S and RQ-8B VTUAV system [Ref 
21].  Table 6 shows the different NAVAIR manning level 






Table 6.   NAVAIR Manning Option Risk Assessment        















57 98 177 LOW
44 98 177 LOW
34 83 177 MEDIUM
28 42 136 HIGH
52 110 180 LOW
40 106 175 LOW
30 95 175 MEDIUM
25 50 139 HIGH





It is assumed that the aviation detachment RQMTS will 
be from the MEDIUM risk category.  This means that the MIW 
module aviation detachment has 34 RQMTS to support 83 
manned flight hours and 177 unmanned flight hours.  The 
ASW/SUW modules have 30 RQMTS each and support 95 manned 
and 175 unmanned flight hours.  
Additionally, it is assumed the operators and support 
elements of the aviation detachment can be organized into 
the generalist and specialist detachments where: 
1. Operator of MH-60R cannot operate MH-60S, 
2. Operator of MH-60S cannot operate MH-60R, 
3. Operator for MH-60R/S can operate RQ-8B VTUAV.  The 
opposite would not be true, 
4. Maintainers of MH-60R can maintain MH-60S and vice 
versa, and 
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5. Maintainers of MH-60R/S can maintain RQ-8B and vice 
versa. 
 
The aviation generalists and specialists are assumed 
to be independent detachments.  This assumption will allow 
the aviation component to be considered separately in 
alternative module force structure analysis.   
 
D. FOCUSED MISSION PACKAGES 
LCS mission packages will include the FMP and its PUK.  
The FMP modules will consist of the manpower required to 
operate and maintain the package equipment along with the 
additional manpower to augment the seaframe crew for 
messing, administration and medical support [Ref 1].  
Figure 2 lists the different modules and their 
systems.  Because a majority of the module systems (i.e., 
the Advanced Deployable System and the Remote Mine-hunting 
Vehicle) are emerging systems, the proxy methodology is 
used to estimate these RQMTS.  The module systems are 
itemized in Table 7 along with the basis for their manning 
estimates.   
















Figure 2.   FMP Modules and Systems 
FMP Modules and Systems
MIW Modules QTY
USV with 1
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USV with EO/IR 2
Gun Package 1
Missile Package 1







Intermediate Caliber Gun Module 2
Non-Lethal Weapon 2
ACES – Active Capable Expendable Surveillance
ADS – Advanced Deployable System
ALMDS – Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
AMNS – Airborne Mine Neutralization System
AQS-20A – Minehunting Sonar
BPAUV – Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
COBRA – Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance & Analysis
EOD Det – Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment
OASIS – Organic Airborne & Surface Influence Sweep
RAMICS – Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System
RMV – Remote Minehunting Vehicle
SCULPIN – Autonomous Bottom Mapping UUV system
USV – Unmanned Surface Vehicle
VTUAV – Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
 
 

















AN/WLD-1 RMV MNV 
Periscope Detection Search Radar 




ACES/EER/IEER/AEER Family Sonobuoys 
Torpedo Countermeasure NIXIE 
ADS Sonobuoys 
Towed Array TACTAS 
Intermediate Caliber Gun 25MM Bushmaster 
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Module systems and their support personnel are assumed 
to be independent components of a FMP module.  Thus, these 
systems and personnel can be organized into groups of 
generalists and specialists.  Generalists are non-warfare 
specific personnel, capable of operating with different 
module systems or in different warfare areas.  They must be 
able to operate in at least two different warfare areas 
(e.g., RMV Support personnel can maintain the RMV across 
the MIW and ASW warfare areas).  Specialists are system or 
mission specific personnel (e.g., mission C4 and MH-60S 
pilots) who, because of their specialty skill, are limited 
in system or operational flexibility.  They are assigned to 
one particular system or warfare area.  Specialists are 
assumed to have no more than two main specialties.  For 
example, an engineman (EN) is limited to operating and 
supporting the diesel and gas turbine engines only. 
For module command, control, computers and 
communications (C4), every FMP will have an Officer-in-
charge (OIC) and the administrative and support 
requirements.  The mission C4 may also consist of 
watchstanders who will help integrate the module systems 
into the LCS seaframe’s architecture and be the standby 
watchstanders to support the various module systems. 
The module generalists and specialists are assumed to 
be independent detachments.  This assumption will allow the 
individual detachments to be considered in alternative 






LCS maintenance will be based upon Condition-based 
Maintenance (CBM), Engineered Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) and the CMP from the FFG.  Assume LCS 
initially utilizes the same maintenance schedule similar to 
a CONUS-based FFG.  Then, the maintenance factor will 1.00 
which means LCS will be in the deployment cycle 100% of the 
time during a 20-month period.  
With a shore-based module force and a squadron 
organization, the LCS has the potential to transfer some of 
its routine maintenance workload ashore.  While in 
homeport, the LCS can remove failing or suspect equipment 
and parts and replace them with those already serviced by 
the supporting shore infrastructure.  This will require the 
shore infrastructure to use some of the LCS force while 
ashore to perform maintenance that would have been time 
consuming and non-essential during operations. 
Some of the rates assumed to perform routine 
maintenance work onboard the LCS seaframe include the FC, 
GM, EM and EN rates.  When the workload is transfered 
ashore, the RQMTS associated with them are also 
transferred.  These RQMTS will be filled by personnel who 
have just returned from deployment or who are available 
during the inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC). 
These maintenance assumptions have the potential to 
sustain, and even increase, the reliability of the assumed 
LCS systems and machinery.  Moreover, they have the 
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V. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focused on the RQMTS for the LCS seaframe 
and FMP modules as well as the efficient organization of 
the module personnel.     
Analysis of legacy Ship Manpower Documents (SMD) for 
the cruisers, destroyers, frigates, mine countermeasure and 
coastal mine-hunting ships provided the best estimation of 
the baseline RQMTS for the LCS seaframe and modules.  The 
study showed how the baseline RQMTS can be reduced by 
compounding the effects of reduced manning initiatives and 
paradigm shifts.  The reduced manning initiatives analyzed 
in this study were limited to the Smart Ship project on the 
CG and OME on the DDG.  The paradigm shifts are key 
culture, policy and procedural items taken from past 
studies and quantifying their effects. 
Quantifying the effect of the paradigm shift was a 
subjective but key element of this analysis.  A subject 
matter expert was used to verify and validate the 
quantified effects [Ref 22].   
The methodology began with the baseline RQMTS and then 
reduced that RQMTS by compounding the effects from the 
reduced manning initiatives and paradigm shifts.  The 
methodology was first applied to the seaframe RQMTS, and 
then was applied to the individual RQMTS.  The resulting 
reduced RQMTS were the minimum RQMTS possible under the 
assumptions of this thesis. 
After compounding all the effects, the resulting 
reduced module RQMTS were used to explore several personnel 
management options for the module personnel.  The first 
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option was to “pre-package” them, and the second was to 
“flex” them.  The best option led to a more efficient use 
of the module personnel, and reduced the overall module 
RQMTS producing even more savings. 
Ultimately, the study determined if the LCS minimal 
manning objective was feasible, and under what level of 
aggressiveness.  It also determined if further savings 






The baseline RQMTS estimate for the seaframe and 
modules began with the analysis of the legacy Ship Manpower 
Documents (SMD) for the Ticonderoga (CG-47), Arleigh Burke 
(DDG-51), Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7), Avenger (MCM-1) and 
Osprey (MHC-51) classes of ships and their respective 
configuration.  Using these ships as proxies for various 
functions of LCS, the analysis produced the RQMTS and 
systems data required for the optimization equations used 
in this study.     
To estimate the baseline RQMTS for the seaframe, the 
notional LCS systems were itemized similar to the legacy 
systems data.  If the notional system was found as a legacy 
system, then the minimum associated legacy RQMTS were used 
as the RQMTS for that particular system.  If the system was 
an emerging system or does not yet exist, then the closest 
proxy from the legacy system was used to represent the 
RQMTS for that particular system.   
Using a system of optimization equations in EXCEL®, 
the total seaframe RQMTS were estimated and used as the 
seaframe baseline RQMTS.  The resulting baseline RQMTS was 
from the “business as usual” approach.  
The seaframe baseline RQMTS was then reduced through 
the compounded effects of the reduced manning initiatives 
and suggested paradigm shifts.  Reduced manning initiatives 
include the Smart Ship and Optimal Manning Experiments 
(OME), and paradigm shifts includes Composite Sailor, 
Technology Leverage and Workload Transfer concepts. 
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The Smart Ship savings realized were based on the 
analysis of the CG SMD with no Smart Ship (CG (NS)) and 
with Smart Ship (CG (SS)), and the actual rate and overall 
savings was applied to the seaframe’s baseline RQMTS 
estimate.  Similarly, the DDG OME savings from the DDG 
without OME (DDG (NO)) and DDG with OME (DDG (OME)) SMDs 
were analyzed and then applied to the LCS seaframe baseline 
estimate on the individual rate level.  The reduction 
effects were compounded. 
The first paradigm shift was a recommended policy and 
training procedure change referred to as the Composite 
Sailor concept.  This concept allowed the sailor to gain 
additional expertise outside their assigned rate, e.g., 
allowing an engineman trained to work on main diesel 
engines to also work on main gas turbine engines.   
The next paradigm shift was a greater reliance on 
technology called the Technology Leverage concept.  The 
Smart Ship program successfully introduced several manpower 
saving technologies like the Integrated Bridge System 
(IBS), Voyage Management System (VMS), fiber optic Local 
Area Network (LAN), Damage Control System (DCS), Integrated 
Condition and Assessment System (ICAS), wireless 
communication system and the Machinery Control System 
(MCS).  When used to their design capability, these seven 
core Smart Ship systems promise to further reduce the LCS 
seaframe RQMTS.     
The last paradigm explored the maintenance and 
workload changes called the Workload Transfer concept where 
the main theme was to reduce the workload onboard the 
seaframe and deploying modules.  This was similar to the 
“pit stop” concept used in automotive racing.  Through this 
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concept, a greater shift of labor intensive, repetitive and 
extensive maintenance and workload requirements are 
performed ashore.  The bottom line was removing as much of 
the workload as possible to allow both the core and 
mission-package crews to focus upon operational matters 
with sufficient focus on maintenance of critical combat 
readiness systems. 
The paradigm shift effects were then quantified and 
reviewed by a manpower technical expert, CDR Charlie Gowen 
(USN, retired) from AmerInd Inc, who has been determining 
manpower requirements for both U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast 
Guard vessels for the past 25 years, and has the 
qualifications and experience to validate the quantified 
paradigm shift effects used in this study [Ref 22].  
The resulting RQMTS, after applying the effects from 
the reduced manning initiatives and paradigm shift 
approaches, was the feasible minimal manning level for the 
seaframe’s core crew. 
The last half of the first objective was to estimate 
the baseline RQMTS for the module.  All modular systems 
were itemized similar to the legacy ships and seaframe.  
Most of the systems in the modules were either emerging or 
do not yet have RQMTS determined.  If the system was a 
legacy system, then the minimum associated legacy RQMTS was 
used as the baseline RQMTS.  Otherwise, the proxy method 
was used to estimate the system’s baseline RQMTS.  Similar 
to the seaframe, a system of optimization equation was used 
in EXCEL® to estimate each warfare module’s baseline RQMTS.   
Individual module RQMTS were then reduced by applying 
the paradigm shifts effect.  Of the three suggested 
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paradigm shifts, only the Composite Sailor concept provided 
any significant reduction in the module RQMTS.  The other 
two paradigm shifts appear to have negligible effects.  The 
Technology Leverage concept produced insignificant 
reductions because most of the module systems were new and 
emerging technologies.  Similarly, the Workload Transfer 
concept produced very little savings because the modules 
were shore-based.  They were only deployed when needed.  
Thus, a majority of their maintenance and workload was 
accomplished ashore while only minimal maintenance and 
supporting workload went with the module when deployed.  
Therefore, only the Composite Sailor paradigm shift had the 
potential to substantially reduce the module RQMTS. 
After the module RQMTS have been reduced, the 
resulting minimum RQMTS were organized into a single 
“module squadron”.  Because only a small percentage of the 
modules acquired actually deploy at a given time, the “pre-
packaged” crewing concept lead to inefficient use of 
valuable human capital.  An alternative concept called the 
“flexed” concept was studied to determine if efficiencies 
can be gain by deploying the module personnel in 
detachments as they were needed.  The detachments consisted 
of generalists and specialists.  Generalists were personnel 
capable of supporting more than one specified warfare area, 
and specialists were limited to supporting a particular 
warfare area.  An organization of these detachments lead to 
a more efficient employment of the module personnel.  
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VII. FORMULATION AND DATA 
The core and mission-package crew baselines RQMTS as 
well as the module “flexed” crewing concept RQMTS were 
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3. Decision Variable 
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4. Objective Function 
The first objective was to estimate the LCS seaframe 
(equation 6) and modules (equation 10) baseline RQMTS.  The 
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 Equations used to estimate the individual module 
baseline RQMTS are equations 7 (MIW FMP) through 9 (SUW 
FMP).  The total module RQMTS was the sum of three 
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The third and final, objective function was used to 
determine the “flexed” module RQMTS: 
( )17 9 6
6 7
Total "flexed" module RQMTS =                (equation 11)d c d d c d
d c
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B. DATA   
The configuration data for legacy platforms were 
gathered from unclassified and public sources. 
The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) provided ship’s 
manpower requirements (RQMTS).  Section II of the SMD 
provided the manpower summary by department, officer and 
enlisted.  Section III provided the manpower requirements 
by billet sequence numbers.  The data extracted were the 
quantity of each rate required.  Section IV was the battle 
bill by watchstation numbers.  The watchstation numbers 
provided the RQMTS to support a particular watchstation 
including the systems.  Section V provided the functional 
workload totals for each division [Refs 6-12].   
The data for the aviation detachment RQMTS came from 
NAVAIR 1.2 LCS Alternative Aviation Support Study Final 
Briefout of 14 June 2004 [Ref 21].  

















A. “BUSINESS AS USUAL” ANALYSIS 
The analysis first looked at the RQMTS of legacy 
ships.  The most demanding RQMTS was during Condition I, 
and these RQMTS were used to estimate the seaframe’s 
baseline RQMTS.  The RQMTS for the five legacy platforms 
were derived from section IV of the respective Ship Manning 
Document (SMD).  Because of the Smart Ship and OME, the 
study used the SMD for the CG before and after Smart Ship 
as well as the SMD for the DDG before and after OME.  
Therefore, there were two variants of the CG and DDG legacy 
RQMTS.  The RQMTS analysis for the legacy ships are 
summarized in Table 8.   
 
Table 9.   Legacy Manpower Requirements (RQMTS)             
(From Refs 14-20) 
Dept CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Executive 19 19 15 15 13 5 4
Operations 91 92 101 79 73 48 30
Combat Sys 104 104 105 95 42 0 0
Engineering 68 54 66 62 46 25 16
Supply 57 57 53 45 42 7 5
Total 339 326 340 296 216 85 55
Note: 1) Executive department includes medical
2) Operations department includes deck and navigation  
 
The minimally manned LCS seaframe’s baseline RQMTS was 
calculated based upon the minimum legacy RQMTS for each 
department or system that has a configuration similar to 
the notional LCS.  Minimum legacy RQMTS for the Executive 
Department came from the MHC which has a manning of four.  
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Using the MHC RQMTS directly supports the LCS because both 
are focused mission ships.  The Operations Department for 
LCS is similar, again, to the MCM and MHC Operations 
Departments because all are focused mission ships.  The 
minimum RQMTS for the LCS Operations Department came from 
the MHC which has 30 RQMTS.   The LCS Combat Systems 
Department, however, had more combat systems than the MCM 
and MHC (i.e., the 57MM gun and the RAM).  Therefore, the 
legacy departmental minimum would not work for the LCS.  
Rather, a system-specific methodology was used to estimate 
the total Combat Systems Department RQMTS.  Using the 
proxies, the core LCS combat systems RQMTS are summarized 
in the right hand section of Table 9 below.    
 
Table 10.   Combat Systems RQMTS (From Refs 14-20) 
System Proxy CG CG (SS) DDG DDG (OME) FFG MCM MHC Minimum
57mm BOFORS 5/54 gun 10 10 11 11 6 0 0 6
CIWS Actual 5 5 6 6 5 0 0 5
.50 cal (4) Actual 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8
RAM Actual 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Search RADAR SPS-49 3 3 0 3 3 2 0 2
Air Decoy Actual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Torpedo Decoy Launcher SVTT 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 1
Mine Avoidance SONAR SQS-53C 6 6 7 5 6 7 6 5
TOTAL 26 26 27 34 31 17 14 29  
 
The LCS Combat System Department has a total of 29 
RQMTS which includes the RQMTS for the CIWS 1B gun system 
which was not a part of the two industry team’s LCS 
designs. 
The LCS Engineering Department is both similar and 
different from its legacy counterparts.  The LCS 
engineering plant was the combined diesel and gas turbine 
(CODAG) propulsion system.  All the legacy ships in this 
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study have a single type of propulsion (i.e., diesel or gas 
turbine) but not both.  The Engineering RQMTS were based 
upon the most demanding legacy engineering plant which is 
the gas turbine.  Only the CG, DDG and FFG have gas 
turbines, and the minimum RQMTS comes from the FFG which 
has 46 RQMTS.  Of the 46 RQMTS, there are 10 diesel 
mechanics to support the auxiliary diesel engines.  This 
thesis assumes that these 10 mechanics can also be trained 
to support main propulsion diesel engines.  Therefore, the 
LCS Engineering Department has 46 RQMTS. 
Lastly, the LCS Supply Department RQMTS was calculated 
using the minimum ratio instead of the minimum legacy 
Supply Department RQMTS.  The Supply Ratio used was 
calculated by dividing the number of Supply RQTMS by the 
total number of Non-Supply RQMTS:   
 
                         (equation 12)Supply RQMTSSupply Ratio
Total Non Supply RQMTS
= −  
 
Of the five legacy Supply Ratios, the MHC had the 
smallest ratio.  Using this Supply Ratio, the number of LCS 
Supply RQMTS was calculated by multiplying it with the 
total Non-Supply RQMTS onboard the LCS.  Therefore, the 
calculated LCS Supply Department RQMTS was:  
 
5MHC Supply Ratio =  = 0.10.
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The LCS seaframe baseline RQMTS by department and 
systems is summarized in Table 10 below. 
 
Table 11.   LCS Seaframe Baseline RQMTS (business as usual) 
  Core LCS         Combat System Qty Manning
Department Crew Proxy 57 mm gun/.50 cal 1 14 
Executivea 4 MHC RAM 1 1 
Operationsb 30 MHC Search radar 1 2 
Combat 
Systems 
24 + 5b = 
29 ← Surface decoy 2 
Engineering 46 FFG Air decoy 3 
1 
Supply 11 MHCa Torpedo decoy launcher 2 1 
Total 115 + 5
b 
= 120  Mine avoidance sonar 1 5 
a. Scaled proportionately to smaller crew size using MHC supply ratio 
b. CIWS is not included in current Flight-0 LCS designs.  Estimated manning 
level of 5 
 
The estimated seaframe (without mission module) RQMTS 
of 115-120 clearly exceeds the threshold of 110 that 
applies to the composite seaframe and module.  Recalling 
that just the aviation components of the mission modules 
will require 30-34 personnel, we conclude that this 
baseline will have to be substantially reduced. 
 
B. REDUCED MANNING INITIATIVES 
The lessons learned and savings from Smart Ship and 
OME are the first steps in reducing the LCS seaframe 
baseline RQMTS.  The policies, procedures and technology 
changes affected every aspect of shipboard routine and 
organization.  The final saving estimates were calculated 
by analyzing the changes in the rates contained in Section 
VI (Summary of Manpower Requirements) of the SMD. [Refs 14 
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to 17]  The effects of Smart Ship and OME on the individual 
departments are summarized in Table 11. 
 
Table 12.   Smart Ship and OME Reductions By Department   




Combat Sys 0.0% 10.5%
Engineering 25.9% 6.5%
Supply 0.0% 17.8%  
 
However, the overall effects were somewhat sobering.  
Smart Ship had an overall savings, after analyzing the CG 
(NS) and CG (SS) SMDs, of 4% while OME overall savings, 
after analyzing the DDG and DDG (OME) SMDs, was three times 
that at 12.9%. 
 
1. Smart Ship  
For the CG, Smart Ship savings were realized 
throughout several rates.  The affected rates are 
summarized in Table 12. 
 
Table 13.   Smart Ship Effect by Rate (From Refs 14 and 15) 
Rate Original New Change Saving Percentage 
Boatswain’s Mate (BM) 7 8 +1 -14.3% 
Damage Controlman (DC) 10 8 -2 20.0% 
Electrician’s Mate (EM) 6 5 -1 16.7% 
Fireman (FN) 12 9 -3 25.0% 
Gas Turbine, Electrical (GSE) 20 12 -8 40.0% 
 
 
When the effects were applied to the LCS seaframe 
baseline RQMTS, the 4% Smart Ship savings removed the RQMTS 
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for an EM, DC and three GSs.  The overall LCS manning level 
of 120 was thus reduced to 115 – not nearly enough of a 
reduction to accommodate required additional module 
personnel. 
 
2. Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment (OME) 
For the DDG, OME also affected every facet of the 
ship’s organization.  Most reductions were accomplished by 
policy and procedural changes supported with minimal 
technology leveraging.  The overall OME savings for the DDG 
was 12.9%. [Refs 8 and 9]  Compared to the Smart Ship 
effects, OME definitely had a bigger effect.  Table 13 
summarized the effects of OME across the different rates 




















Table 14.   Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment Savings by Rate 
(From Ref 16 and 17) 
Rate Original 
After 
OME Change Percentage 
Surface Warfare Officer, Qualified (1110) 11 10 -1 -9.1% 
Surface Warfare Officer, Training (1160) 5 8 +3 37.5% 
Medical Officer (2100) 1 0 -1 -100.0% 
Limited Duty Officer, Deck (6120) 1 0 -1 -100.0% 
Limited Duty Officer, Surface Engineer (6130) 1 0 -1 -100.0% 
Warrant Officer, Surface Operations Tech (7120) 0 1 +1 100.0% 
Warrant Officer, Surface Engineer (7130) 0 1 +1 100.0% 
Command, Master Chief Petty Officer (CMD) 0 1 +1 100.0% 
Electrician’s Mate (EM) 5 7 +2 40.0% 
Electronic Technician (ET) 11 14 +3 27.3% 
Fire Controlman (FC) 39 36 -3 -7.7% 
Gunner’s Mate (GM) 17 13 -4 -23.5% 
Gas Turbine Tech, Electrical (GSE) 7 6 -1 -14.3% 
Gas Turbine Tech, Mechanical (GSM) 19 14 -5 -26.3% 
Hospital Corpsman (HM) 2 3 +1 50.0% 
Hull Maintenance Tech (HT) 4 3 -1 -25.0% 
Interior Communications Electrician (IC) 7 4 -3 -42.9% 
Information Systems Tech (IT) 14 12 -2 -14.3% 
Culinary Specialist (CS) 15 11 -4 -26.7% 
Operations Specialist (OS) 31 22 -9 -28.1% 
Quartermaster (QM) 5 6 +1 20.0% 
Ship’s Serviceman (SH) 7 4 -3 -42.9% 
Storekeeper (SK) 10 8 -2 -20.0% 
Signalman (SM) 6 1 -5 -83.3% 
Seaman (SN) 31 26 -5 -16.1% 
SONAR Technician, Surface (STG) 20 17 -3 -15.0% 
Yeoman (YN) 6 2 -4 -66.7% 
 
When the OME effects were compounded with the Smart 
Ship effects, it reduced the post-Smart Ship LCS seaframe 
RQMTS from 115 to 96.  See Appendix R.  OME produced an 
additional 115 96 16.5%
115
− =  reduction of the baseline RQMTS. 
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After the compounded savings from Smart Ship and OME 
were applied to the original seaframe baseline RQMTS, the 
reduced LCS manning level of 96 would be feasible against 
the threshold of 110, except that it still left very little 
room for module personnel.  The reduced manning initiative 
effects are summarized in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3.   LCS Seaframe RQMTS Before Paradigm Shift     
(From Refs 14 - 20) 























Knowing that the modules will require in excess of 30-
34 additional personnel, the seaframe RQMTS must be reduced 
even more.  This required some “out of the box” paradigm 
shifts to further reduce the RQMTS.  The paradigm shifts 
considered were the Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage 
and Workload Transfer concepts.   
 
C. PARADIGM SHIFTS 
“[OME] accomplished [the manpower] reductions by 
combining watch stations underway, by creating 
and relying on shore detachments to handle 
routine preventive maintenance and administrative 
requirements, and by developing and taking 
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advantage of other efficiencies such as self-
service laundry and food lines [Ref 9]”.  
 
Changes from “business as usual” can accelerate the 
advances supporting the minimal manning concept.  The OME 
manpower reduction methods can be grouped into three 
categories of Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and 
Workload Transfer.  Composite Sailor capitalizes on the 
watch station combinations and extends that to rates that 
are similar in function and responsibility.  Technology 
Leverage aggressively uses the Smart Ship technologies to 
further reduce the RQMTS.  Similarly, Workload Transfer 
builds upon the supporting precepts of the PAPA detachment 
and ERM. Workload Transfer seeks to reduce the 
administrative and routine workload onboard the LCS.  This 
concept also supports the Composite Sailor to allow the 
ship’s commanding officer more control of the crew’s time. 
 
1. Composite Sailor 
The seaframe’s post-reduction manning initiatives RQMTS 
was then analyzed for the effects of the Composite Sailor 
concept.  The Composite Sailor RQMTS reductions are: 
OPS: QM (2)  
CS: GUN/ORD OFF, STG (3)  
ENG: MPA, AUXO, EN (4), HT (2), MR   
 and GS (3)  
See Appendix R for the detail listing of RQMTS affected 
by the Composite Sailor concept.  
The Composite Sailor reduced the RQMTS from 96 to 78.  
Part of the reduction includes the GUN/ORD, MPA and 
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AUXILIARY officer positions.  These are assumed covered by 
the senior FC, GM, GS and EN onboard respectively. 
 
2. Technology Leverage 
From the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) to the self-
service food lines, technology that supports manpower 
reductions already exists as evidenced by USS Yorktown’s 
and USS Milius’ successful completion of their experiments 
and the subsequent deployments.   
Key technologies used in this study include: 
1) Smart Ship technologies 
2) Multi-modal consoles (an emerging technology) 
3) Automated damage control devices including the 
automated mechanical and electrical isolation 
systems as well as the installed firefighting 
systems such as the CO2, AFFF and HALON 
firefighting systems. 
The remaining RQMTS were analyzed for reductions 
effects from each of the technologies listed above.  The 
Technology Leverage reductions are: 
OPS: QM, OS (5), BM (2), CTT and IT  
CS:  STG (3), FC (4)   
ENG: DCA OFF, EN (2), DC (2), GS (2) 
SUPPLY: SK (2), CS (2) 
 
3. Workload Transfer (Ship to Shore) 
Routine workload or routine maintenance was moved 
ashore to the shore infrastructure co-located with the LCS 
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module personnel.  By conducting the routine items ashore, 
more time was recapitalized by the crew, saving time and 
RQMTS onboard the LCS. Some of the routine items included 
those conducted by the EM, EN, FC, GM, and SK rates.  The 
seaframe crew had the ability to “reach-back” to homeport 
or other technical supporting sites for assistance, thereby 
reducing the number of specialties RQMTS onboard the LCS. 
Each RQMTS, after the Technology Leverage, was then 
analyzed for the effects of transferring workload ashore.  
The Workload Transfer concept reduced the following RQMTS: 
CS:  GM, FC 
ENG:  EM, EN 
SUPPLY:  SK. 
 
D. CORE CREW ANALYSIS 
Figure 4 summarizes the analysis of the seaframe RQMTS 
as detailed in Appendix R. Table 14 below summarizes the 











Figure 4.   Effects of Paradigm Shifts on LCS Seaframe 
Manning 
Effects of paradigm shifts








































Table 15.   LCS Seaframe Manning (Reduced) 
  Core LCS       Combat System Qty Manning
Department Crew  57 mm gun/.50 cal 1 2 
Executivea 4  RAM 1 1 
Operationsb 12  Search radar 1 2 
Combat 
Systems 9 + 2
b = 11 ← Surface decoy 2 
Engineering 14  Air decoy 3 
1 
Supply 4  Torpedo decoy launcher 2 1 




sonar 1 2 
a. Scaled proportionately to smaller crew size using MHC supply ratio 
b. CIWS is not included in current Flight-0 LCS designs.  Estimated manning 
level of 2 
 
Of the 45 RQMTS, 15 are Condition III watchstanders, 
and the remainders are day-workers.  Condition III has four 
watch stations: OOD, JOOD, TAO and ATAO.  The watchstanders 
and recommended positions are summarized in Table 15. 
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Table 16.   Seaframe Condition III Watch 
Watch-stander Condition III Watch 
OPS OFF, CSO and CHENG TAO 
BM OOD, JOOD 
CTT AIC/ASTAC/ATAO 
GM OOD, JOOD 
OS TAO, AIC/ASTAC/ATAO 
STG AIC/ASTAC/ATAO 
 
The seaframe RQMTS analysis suggested that a level of 
45 RQMTS was possible for the seaframe within the threshold 
of 110 that must also accommodate a mission package crew.   
Next, the analysis determined the individual module 
RQMTS as well as the total module RQMTS.  The modules 
augment the seaframe with a specific warfare capability.  
With this added capability comes additional systems and 
manning.  The next section presents the analysis of 
individual module’s systems and their RQMTS.   
 
E. MISSION PACKAGE CREW ANALYSIS 
The mission package crew was based on the module 
RQMTS.  The RQMTS was calculated using the same methodology 
as for seaframe.  Using the legacy SMD data and an expert 
opinion, the module’s baseline RQMTS (larger total) and 
reduced RQMTS (smaller total) was estimated and validated.  
With the exception of the aviation component, most of the 
module systems were emerging (i.e., SPARTAN, RMV and 
Periscope Detection).  The RQMTS for these emerging systems 
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were estimated using the proxy methodology with legacy 
data.  For example, the SPARTAN was a USV based upon the 
RHIB seaframe and the RMV was assumed to be similar to the 
legacy MNV onboard the MCM and MHC ships.   
The module baseline RQMTS were estimated using the 
optimization equation 7, 8 and 9.  The first, and perhaps 
the biggest, module in the analysis is the mine warfare 
(MIW) module.  The module’s component systems and estimated 
manning are itemized in Figure 5. 
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The baseline sum of the individual MIW systems was 93 
RQMTS.  The biggest RQMTS driver was the aviation component 
at 57 RQMTS which is over half of the entire module RQMTS.  
When this sum of 93 was added to the seaframe RQMTS of 45, 
the MIW focused LCS has 138 RQMTS which was more than the 
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threshold allows.  Hence, further reduction must occur.  Of 
the three approaches (Business As Usual, Reduced Manning 
Initiative and three Paradigm Shifts), only one was 
applicable here.  That was the Composite Sailor paradigm 
shift. 
The Composite Sailor allowed the combination of the 
Operator and Maintainer RQMTS as well as the suggested rate 
combinations suggested earlier in Table 5 (Suggested Rate 
Combination).  Table 16 below summarized the suggested rate 
combinations for the modules. 
 
Table 17.   Suggested Rate Combination For Modules 
Legacy Rate LCS Rate
BM, EN, MM BM 
EM, TM, STG STG 
SK, YN SK 
 
Once all the RQMTS were analyzed for the effects of 
the Composite Sailor, the resulting reduced MIW module had 
53 RQMTS.  When added to the seaframe’s reduced RQMTS, the 
MIW focused LCS has 98 RQMTS which was within the threshold 
of 110. 
The same methodology was applied to the littoral anti-
submarine (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) modules.  The 
principal differences between these modules and the MIW 
module are the manned helicopter, which is the MH-60R, and 
the two USVs.  The modules baseline and reduced RQMTS are 




Figure 6.    ASW Module RQMTS 
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After all the module baselines were reduced, the LCS 
modules had RQMTS ranging from 45 in the SUW to the large 
MIW of 53.  The maximum RQMTS for a focused mission LCS is 
98, and the minimum RQMTS was 90.   
 
F. LCS MODULE FORCE ANALYSIS 
The Navy plans to procure 56 LCS seaframes, 47 MIW, 34 
ASW and 30 SUW FMPs (total of 111 FMPs).  The FMPs do not 
include the 8 FMPs procured during the development phase.  
It is assumed that these 8 additional FMPs are 3 MIW, 3 ASW 
and 2 SUW FMPs.  When these eight additional FMPs are added 
with the 111, the sum is 119 FMPs (50 MIW, 37 ASW and 32 
SUW).  However, not all of the seaframes and FMPs will be 
deployable at any given time.  To assign RQMTS to each FMP, 
even while not deployed, would be an inefficient use of 
critical human capital.  A better way to assign manpower is 
by skills vice an entire module.  This will allow greater 
flexibility in manpower assignment and reduce the overall 
LCS force RQMTS. 
Under the “Business As Usual” approach, the LCS force 
would be a relatively large “pre-packaged” force.  “Pre-
packaged” means the traditional one-crew one-ship (or in 
this case, one-module) assignment.  The converse is the 
“flexed” concept where the crew is deployed as needed 
regardless of the module.  Looking ahead to where 56 
seaframes and 119 FMP modules are planned, the estimated 
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8497 RQMTS was a relatively large force size, and this 
large LCS force size could potentially under-utilize 
talented human capital.  Therefore, more efficient force 
utilization was assumed under the “flexed” concept. 
Lessons learned from Smart Ship and OME include 
changes in watchstanding philosophies to reduce the 
workload and, ultimately, reduce manning.  Smart Ship’s 
innovative core/flex watchstanding philosophies permitted 
the ship to meet the spirit of the ROC/POE requirements 
while improving quality of life and better personnel 
management.  The core/flex watch concept was again used 
onboard the USS Milius for OME.  Similarly, the LCS module 
force will be organized and “flexed” to meet operational 
requirements.  The module personnel are organized into 
twelve (12) different detachments of generalists and 
specialists.  Table 17 summarized the different 




























MH-60S & UAV Oper
MH-60R & UAV Oper  
 
The detachments were similar to the Smart Ship 
“flexed” watchstanders who were called upon when they were 
needed.  When the detachments were needed to conduct a 
particular littoral warfare operation, they were deployed 
with the modules to the seaframe or theater.   
However, the number of deployable modules was much 
less than 119.  Only 25% of the 56 seaframes will be 
deployable at any given time.  Suppose there are 15 
deployable seaframe, which is approximately 25% of the 56 
seaframes planned, then the number of modules required will 
also be about 25% of the 119 planned.  To properly 
determine the number of MIW, ASW and SUW modules required, 
first calculate the ratio of each module against the total 
modules planned.   




ASW modules: 37 31%
119
=  
SUW modules: 32 27%
119
=  
Next, multiply each ratio by the number of deployable 
seaframes (in this case 15) to determine the number of FMP 
modules required.   
MIW modules: 42%*15 13.4 13Seaframes MIWModules= ≈  
ASW modules: 31%*15 9.9 10Seaframes ASWModules= ≈  
SUW modules: 27%*15 8.6 9Seaframes SUWModules= ≈  
Therefore, 32 modules are required to support 15 deployable 
seaframes.  The “pre-packaged” deployable LCS force for the 
15 seaframes and 32 modules would have 2279 RQMTS, of which 
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The “flexed” deployable LCS module force would only 
consist of module personnel.  The seaframe RQMTS must be 
“pre-packaged” with the seaframe, but the module RQMTS are 
more flexible because they are shore-based until needed.  
Ashore, the module force is organized into the 12 
detachments seen earlier in Table 17.  Appendix V 
summarizes the “flexed” detachments, supported warfare and 
the quantity of each rate within the detachment.  If a 
particular rate supports at least two warfare areas, then 
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it is considered a generalist.  Otherwise, it is a 
specialist.   
To calculate the total “flexed” RQMTS, the 
optimization equation 11 was used. 
( )17 9 6
6 7
Total "flexed" module RQMTS =                (equation 11)d c d d c d
d c




For example, to estimate the “flexed” RQMTS for the 
RMV Support detachments, first determine the number of 
warfare areas supported.  In this case, there are two, the 
MIW and ASW warfare, which makes it a generalist.  
Therefore, the “flexed” RQMTS for this detachment is the 
product of the detachment size and the number of seaframes.   
11 6 11RMV Support "flexed" RQMTS = 1*15*3 45d c dG N X RQMTS= = = = =  
 
By applying this calculation and methodology to all 
twelve detachments across the three littoral warfare areas, 
the 32 total “flexed” modules (13 ASW, 10 MIW, 9 SUW) have 
1151 RQMTS, as compared to 1604 RQMTS when “pre-packaged”.  
Table 18 summarized the comparison of the two manpower 
force structures.   
 
Table 19.   Deployable Module Force Structure Comparison 
With Air Det W/o Air Det Air Det
Pre-packaged, total 1604 592 1012
Flexed, total 1151 493 658
Personnel Saving 453 99
Reduction 71.8% 83.3%
Savings 28.2% 16.7%
Cost @ $60K per person ($M) 96.2$                     35.5$             
Savings @ $60K personnel cost ($M) 69.1$                     29.6$             
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“Flexed” option has 453 fewer RQMTS than the 1604 
“pre-packaged” RQMTS.  In the end, the savings is 
approximately $27.2M per deployment cycle.  This estimate 
used the conservative personnel cost of $60K per RQMT.  By 
multiplying the savings and the deployment rotational 
factor of 3 to 4, the potential savings range from $80M to 
$110M.   
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IX. SUMMARY  
 The “business as usual” approach estimated the RQMTS 
for a focused mission LCS from 195 to 215.  Of these 
numbers, the seaframe has a baseline RQMTS of 120 and the 
MIW, ASW and SUW modules have 95, 90 and 75 RQMTS 
respectively.  These requirements clearly exceed the LCS 
total RQMTS of 110. 
 Applying the lessons learned and savings gained from 
reduced manning initiatives like Smart Ship and Fleet 
Optimal Manning Experiments (OME) help, but not enough to 
meet the targeted manning levels set for LCS.  Smart Ship 
reduced the seaframe baseline RQMTS by 4.2% or from 120 
RQMTS to 115; additionally, OME’s overall savings of 15.8% 
reduced that even further to 96.  The requirements are 
within the threshold of 110, but does not include the 
module RQMTS.  More reduction measures are needed to 
accommodate the module RQMTS. 
 Additional measures explored were paradigm shifts in 
policy and operations called the Composite Sailor, 
Technology Leverage and Workload Transfer concepts.  The 
Composite Sailor reduced the seaframe RQMTS an additional 
15.0% down to 78 RQMTS; Technology Leverage yielded the 
largest reduction at 23.3% reducing the seaframe RQMTS to 
50; and Workload Transfer produced the final 4.2% reduction 
to achieve the minimal manning of 45 RQMTS. 
 The module baseline RQMTS were reduced using only the 
paradigm shift Composite Sailor concept.  The MIW module 
RQMTS was reduced by 43% from 93 to 53 RQMTS; the ASW 
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module was reduced by 42.7% from 89 to 51; and the SUW 
module was reduced by 37.5% from 72 to 45. 
 Combining the reduced seaframe and module RQMTS, the 
RQMTS for a focused mission LCS was reduced from the 
average values of 207 to 95.  The reduced seaframe RQMTS 
was 45 with the MIW, ASW and SUW module RQMTS at 53, 51 and 
45 respectively.  Therefore, the MIW focused LCS has 98 
RQMTS; ASW focused LCS has 96 RQMTS; and SUW focused LCS 
has 90 RQMTS. These requirements are within the LCS total 
RQMTS threshold of 110, and the first objective appeared 
feasible. 
 Additionally, the study’s second objective looked at 
the LCS force-wide implications of the results from the 
first objective.  The LCS force was expected to have 56 
seaframes and 119 FMP modules.  The estimated total 
seaframe RQMTS was 2,520 for the fleet of 56 seaframes.  
With the estimated module breakout of 50 MIW, 37 ASW and 32 
SUW modules, the estimated total module RQMTS was 5977.  
Therefore, the estimated total LCS force had 8,497 RQMTS. 
By de-linking the systems and RQMTS from the different 
modules, a more efficient way to manage the module 
personnel is possible.  By organizing the module personnel 
into 12 detachments, the LCS module force could be deployed 
with greater flexibility and reduced its RQMTS.  Using the 
optimization equations to minimize the module force total 
RQMTS, the “flexed” concept has proven that it can produce 
a savings of ~28% over the “pre-packaged” concept for, for 
example, 15 seaframes with 32 modules.  In this example, 
the LCS module force has 1,604 RQMTS under the “pre-
packaged” concept, and it has 1151 RQMTS under the “Flexed” 
concept.  The difference is 453 RQMTS.  This means, at a 
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conservative cost of $60K per sailor, the potential saving 
is ~$27M.  When the rotation factor of 3-4 is considered, 
the saving is ~$80M to ~$110M per deployment cycle.   By 
flexing the LCS module force, the Navy can gain, on 
average, 25% to 30% of its LCS module manpower cost.  This 
translates into a potential monetary savings of $80M to 
$110M. 
 This is one of the ways of “harvesting efficiencies to 















X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis supported the minimally manned concept for 
the LCS seaframe and FMP modules.  The top down manpower 
analysis used SMDs for legacy ships with “business as 
usual” approach and yielded a focus mission LCS with an 
average manning of approximately 207.  This estimate, 
though large, was used as the RQMTS baseline estimate.  
When reducing the RQMTS baseline, previous manning 
reduction initiatives like Smart Ship and OME are not 
enough.  The Navy can have minimally manned LCS seaframes 
and FMP modules if, and only if, the suggested paradigm 
shifts of Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and 
Workload Transfer are pursued.  The pursuit could yield an 
LCS seaframe with 45 RQMTS and the mission-package RQMTS of 
45 to 53.  The result is a focused mission LCS that meets 
the threshold limit. 
However, the means to reduce the total RQMTS for a 
focused mission LCS to 75 or less was not readily 
identifiable.   
Additionally, this study has also demonstrated that a 
“flexed” concept of module personnel management could 
potentially yield manpower annual cost savings of 25% to 
30% or roughly $80M to $110M over the one-crew per module 
or “pre-packaged” concept.   
 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The minimally manned LCS seaframe and modules can be 
realized if, and only if, the assumed paradigm shifts with 
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the supporting technologies are pursued.  The Smart Ship 
technologies have proven they can advance changes in policy 
and operations especially in the areas of ship operation, 
training, maintenance and administrative support.    
Recommendation: Pursue the Composite Sailor, 
Technology Leverage, and Workload Transfer paradigm shifts 
as well as advancing the technologies assumed in this 
study.  The technologies appear readily available to 
support the minimal manning concept intended for LCS.   
Recommendation: The Composite Sailor paradigm shift 
requires the synergy of the BM, CTT, DC, EN, ET, GS, HT, 
MM, MR, OS, QM, STG and TM rates.  Examine the KSAs of 
these rates to determine the Composite Sailor’s actual 
requirements for the BM (combination of BM, EN, MM and QM), 
ET (combination of CTT and ET), DC (combination of DC, HT 
and MR), EN/GS and STG/TM rates that have been suggested 
for the LCS. 
Recommendation: Conduct a study to determine the 
optimal training curriculum for the above rates.  A series 
of schools training time and KSA requirements data will 
support an optimized training pipeline to train these 
personnel effectively and efficiently to support the 
minimal manning concept.  Minimal manning onboard LCS will 
require the ability of this training path to respond to 
manning shortfalls.   
Recommendation: Combine watch-station requirements of 
Operator and Maintainer into a single Operator/Maintainer 
requirement to facilitate increased personnel flexibility.  
This will greatly support flexed organizations like the 
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Smart Ship Core/Flex watch philosophy as well as the 
“flexed” module force concept.   
Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Bridge System 
(IBS) and Voyage Management System (VMS).  Increased 
digital chart coverage could add to the feasibility of the 
IBS/VMS system.  Use the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) 
along with the Voyage Management System (VMS) more 
liberally.  Supporting this is the recommendation to 
increase the coverage provided by digital/electronic charts 
to reduce the time consuming task of chart preparations and 
management.  When combined with other technologies such as 
bow thrusters, the IBS/VMS could reduce the ship control 
requirements down to just a few personnel unlike the 
crowded legacy ship control requirements.   
Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Condition 
Assessment System (ICAS) and Machinery Control System (MCS) 
with the improved On-Board Trainer (OBT). Change philosophy 
to allow ship control and/or operations control personnel 
to operate and configure ship machinery as required to 
support operations and changing tactical requirements.    
Recommendation: Advance the integrated sensor and 
communications multi-modal consoles (MMC) and the 
integrated weapons and decoy Weapons Control Consoles 
(WCC).  The MMC assumes all communication and sensors are 
integrated into a single station for greater effectiveness.  
The WCC assumes the control functions of the 57MM, CIWS, 
RAM, Torpedo Decoy Launcher, Air Decoy Launcher and TACTAS 
combat systems can be integrated into a single location.  
These systems can significantly add to the watch station 
reductions, and manpower reduction, in the Combat 
Information Center (CIC).  More importantly it gives the 
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decision-maker the ability to access all of the ship’s 
assets to make timely and informed decisions.  
Recommendation: Pursue a UV launch and recovery system 
that is similar to an overhead rail system with automated 
winches and controls operable by only one person.  Use 
Visby Swedish Corvette as a model.   
Recommendation: Pursue automation technology.  The 
SONAR can only be supported by two Operator/Maintainers if 
the log-keeping is automated.  Similar to the flight data 
recorders onboard commercial aircrafts, the log-keeping of 
the SONAR equipment can be automated.  This will allow a 
more accurate data storage and facilitate data for follow-
on analysis.  Recommend pursuing this technology. 
Recommendation: Operate with unmanned engineering 
spaces during Condition III steaming.  This will leverage 
the technology to allow the engineers more control of their 
time.  Personnel will only be required for start-ups, 
shutdowns and condition-based maintenance requirements.  
The spaces do not have to be manned after start-up and 
shut-down evolutions.  During Condition I, engineering 
spaces will only require a monitor in the critical 
engineering spaces (i.e., main engineroom and electrical 
generation rooms) to respond and stabilize from casualties.  
Operating in this manner will also permit bridge and CIC 
watchstanders to operate the engineering plant in direct 
support of mission readiness without delay. 
Recommendation: Operate with reduced Damage Control 
party requirements and increase reliance on 
technology/automation.   The Rapid Response Team (RRT), or 
minimum fire party, requires a scene leader, investigators, 
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nozzleman and hoseman.  Employ the RRT initially and 
augment as required. 
Primary DCC should be located near machinery controls 
which is assumed to be in CCS, and secondary should be 
located near the decision makers either in the pilot house 
or CIC.  In this case, recommend secondary CCS in the pilot 
house to facilitate greater control and less workload 
increase in CIC.   
Recommendation:  Organize the shore infrastructure to 
support the reduced maintenance onboard the LCS using 
concepts similar to a “pit stop.” Reduce the workload 
onboard the seaframe.  Determine the workload of 45 
personnel, and remove the remainder if possible.  Conduct 
as much routine and large maintenance requirements ashore 
as possible.  Both critical and routine spares and parts 
need to be readily available to sustain the LCS operational 
availability and reliability. 
Recommendation: Assign future LCS personnel to an 
operational LCS seaframe for indoctrination.  With a 
limited indoctrination period, every LCS sailor must be 
afforded the opportunity to get familiar with an LCS for a 
short period of time prior to assignment to either the LCS 
or the modules.  With the largest combined manpower RQMT of 
98, a focused LCS can accommodate additional personnel 
onboard for training and indoctrination with minimal impact 
on the core crew accommodations.  A trainer would be 
required to manage the training curriculum. 
In conclusion, personnel assigned to LCS must be 
trained and qualified to the fullest extent possible.  
There is very limited flexibility in the LCS force 
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structure to support gaps beyond a reasonable length of 
time.  If a sailor is unable to fulfill their function 
onboard LCS, a replacement must be ready and available for 
immediate relief.  Otherwise, mission readiness will 
quickly become an adverse factor. 
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XI. FUTURE STUDY 
During the operation of LCS Flight 0 ships, data will 
be collected on human performance, incidence of human 
errors and near misses, accidents and mishaps, situations 
of excessive workload, and habitability/quality-of-life 
problems.  These data will be used in Flight I system 
design and development to improve human-machine interfaces, 
and ship and system design for operability, 
maintainability, supportability, survivability, usability 
and safety [Ref 1]. 
 
A. FATIGUE STUDY ON LCS FLIGHT “0” 
A key element to sustain the minimal manning concept 
is fully functioning sailor.  Personnel effectiveness is 
highly dependent upon the amount and quality of sleep.  
Sleep is a force enabler, and a regimented sleeping program 
to allow optimal sleep will prove vital to enable the crew 
to perform at the peak effectiveness.    For this study, 
the critical personnel (i.e., bridge and combat information 
center watchstanders) predicted effectiveness goal was 
assumed to be 80% with the threshold at 65%.   
 
Table 20.   Critical Personnel Effectiveness (Hursh FAST & 
SAFTE model) 
 Threshold Goal 
Personnel Effectiveness Level 80% 95% 
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On average, to be totally effective, a sailor requires 
7-9 hours of moderate to excellent quality sleep.  If the 
sailor is only getting moderate quality sleep, 
effectiveness will decline.  Moderate sleep is defined as 
that which is almost undisturbed with some tossing and 
turning.  Moderate to excellent sleep will help the sailors 
sustain, and even regain, their effectiveness.  Excellent 
sleep is defined as undisturbed sleep where all sleep 
stages, including rapid eye movement (REM), can occur.  A 
regimented sleep program is vital to sustain the sailor’s 
performance, especially in situations of reduced manning. 
When a sailor is getting moderate to excellent sleep 
before getting underway, their average peak effectiveness 
during waking hours is 95%-99%.  Once underway and getting 
only moderate sleep from 2200-0600, the same individual’s 
average effectiveness drops down to 55%-60%.  See Figure 7. 
 
Figure 8.   Typical Personnel Effectiveness After 




The effectiveness plot reaches the steady state of about 
60% after 10 days underway from port.  During the steady 
state, the biggest degradation in effectiveness occurs 
during the watch hours of midnight-0400 and 2000-2400.  
During these watches the personal effectiveness level is 
dangerously low at around 50%.   
Overall, this notional daily routine is considered 
marginal (average effectiveness is 66%) if safe personnel 
effectiveness level is assumed 65% or above.  A regimented 
sleep program will be required to improve personnel 
effectiveness to, for example, 75%.  This is especially 
important for minimally manned ships like LCS. 
The recommended sleep regiment to obtain 75% personnel 
effectiveness level is the same from 2200-0600.  However, 
this would require that every sleeping moment be excellent 
sleep quality.  It is also recommended that naps be 
included into the daily routine from 1200-1300.  A 45 to 60 
minute nap will improve the original effectiveness from 66% 
to 70%.  Thirty minute naps only improved the original 











Figure 9.   Personnel Effectiveness After Underway (With 
Auto Sleep) (From FAST Program) 
 
 The topic of sleep and fatigue is a growing concern, 
and the fatigue study has the potential to add value to the 
understanding crew requirements especially onboard a 
minimally manned ship like the LCS.  
 
B. TASK ANALYSIS ON LCS FLIGHT “0” 
One of the key elements used in the current manpower 
requirements determination process is the workload measured 
in hours.  The workload data was not available to support 
this manpower study.  However, workload data can be 
gathered after the delivery of the two LCS Flight 0 ships. 
A future study to gather the workload data, in hours, 
by conducting on-site data collection would be useful.  The 
data will then be used to validate manpower estimates from 
this study and improve the manning requirements for LCS 
Flight I ships. 
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C. LCS MANPOWER COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Although this study suggested ways to save manpower 
costs, the actual cost to pursue the suggested paradigm 
shifts was not studied.  The cost benefit analysis (CBA) of 
this pursuit would also add to the feasibility of the 
minimal manning concept as well as predict a more accurate 
cost savings.  The CBA study is expected to produce better 
(more) savings than the conservative $60K personnel cost 
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APPENDIX A. NOTIONAL PROJECTED OPERATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
1. The LCS XX Class littoral combat ship's mission 
is to operate offensively in a high density, multi-threat 
environment as an integral member of a Carrier Strike 
Group, Surface Action Group or Expeditionary Strike Group.  
In addition, the LCS XX provides its own limited Air 
Defense (AD), limited Surface Warfare (SUW), limited Mine 
Warfare (MIW) and Undersea Warfare (USW) self-defense, and 
can effectively provide some local subsurface and surface 
area protection to the Group or Force. 
2. The most demanding operating environment 
anticipated for the LCS XX Class is forward deployed 
wartime operations within the littoral battlespace in 
cooperation with designated joint/allied forces, including 
operations involving coordination of land and sea-based 
aviation.  These operations are frequently characterized by 
confined and congested water and air space occupied by 
friends, adversaries, and neutrals -- making rapid 
identification and efficient coordination profoundly 
difficult.  In this environment, adversaries can 
concentrate and layer their defenses. 
3. Peacetime forward operations in littoral areas 
are also very demanding.  In an era characterized by the 
proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, coupled with the 
advance of the global war on terrorism, the LCS XX Class 
can anticipate surprise attack by submarines, coastal 
missiles, mines, sea-skimming cruise missiles, and theater 
ballistic missiles, terrorist and other asymmetrical 
threats.  A substantial percentage of operations will be 
conducted within the highly variable littoral. 
4. LCS XX is capable of performing all assigned 
primary mission areas simultaneously while maintaining 
Readiness Condition I, II, III (wartime/forward deployment 
cruising readiness), IV (peacetime training underway 
operations) or V (in port training and maintenance). 
5. In an environment in which repair facilities are 
limited, the ability of the Carrier/ Expeditionary Strike 
Group and LCS XX Class ship to be self-sufficient is of 
paramount importance.  While operating within a Strike 
Group, the LCS XX may be called upon, on an infrequent 
basis, to provide repair assistance to other units.  This 
assistance is provided by existing ship’s force personnel, 
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specifically, by Sailors in billets requiring Journeyman-
level skills.  Battle Force Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (BFIMA) NECs, proficiency-based Journeyman level 
NECs attained at Fleet Maintenance Activities, are assigned 
to enhance the capabilities of the Carrier/Expeditionary 
Strike Group and own unit to be self-sufficient.  Specific 
BFIMA NECs assignments follow: 
 
RATING SKILL AREA NEC 
BM Rigger/Weight Tester BM-0120 
EN Valve Repair Tech MM-4540 
EN Diesel Engine Repair Tech EN-4340 
GSM Hydraulics Repair Tech MM-4541 
GSM Pump Repair Tech MM-4222 
GSM Gas Turbine Repair Tech GS-4140 
EN A/C & R Tech MM-4223 
EM Outside Electrical Repair Tech EM-4651 
IC Interior Communications Tech IC-4781 





APPENDIX B. NOTIONAL REQUIRED OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY 
1. The LCS XX Class ship’s mission is to operate 
offensively in a high-density multi-threat environment as an 
integral member of a Carrier Strike Group, Surface Action 
Group or Expeditionary Strike Group.  In addition it 
provides its own limited Air Defense (AD), limited Surface 
Warfare (SUW) and Undersea Warfare (USW) self-defense and 
can effectively provide some local area protection to the 
Force, Group or other military shipping against subsurface 
and surface threats.  Accordingly, the following primary and 
secondary warfare mission areas are assigned: 
 
P = Primary  PF = Primary with FMP S = Secondary  
LCS XX CLASS 
AAW AMW SUW ASW CCC C2W FSO INT LOG MIW MOB MOS NCO
S S PF PF P P S S S PF P P S 
 
2. The LCS XX is not capable of providing facilities 
for an embarked warfare commander and staff. 
 
3. Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) are 
reported under readiness conditions having major 
significance in determining the unit's total manpower 
requirements.  The following summarizes conditions covered: 
 
Condition I:  Battle Readiness  
While in Condition I (Battle Readiness), the ship shall be 
capable of meeting the following criteria: able to perform all 
offensive and defensive functions simultaneously; able to keep 
all installed systems manned and operating for maximum 
effectiveness; required to accomplish only minimal maintenance 
- that routinely associated with watch standing and urgent 
repairs.  For the LCS XX, this condition means self-defense 
measures are being performed.  Evolutions such as 
replenishment, law enforcement or helo operations are not 
appropriate unless the evolution stations are co-manned by 
personnel from other battle stations.  The maximum expected 






Condition II:  Modified Battle Readiness 
Condition II is Condition I Battle Readiness modified to 
meet particular imminent threats that are situation-dependent.  
As such, Condition II is a subset of Condition I that stands 
up particular Condition I capabilities at the discretion of 
the task force or group commander, or commanding officer.  
While in Condition II, the ship shall be capable of meeting 
the following criteria: able to simultaneously perform those 
offensive and defensive functions necessary to counter 
specific imminent, limited threats; able to keep required 
operational systems continuously manned and operating; able to 
perform other command and control functions relevant to the 
threat which are not required to be accomplished 
simultaneously; able to accomplish urgent underway Planned 
Maintenance and support functions. The maximum expected 
continuous duration for Condition II is 10 days, with a 
minimum of 4 to 6 hours of rest provided per man per day.  
Since scenarios can't be fixed in advance for all foreseeable 
combinations of circumstances other than full general 
quarters, a Condition II column is not portrayed in the table 
of ROCs.  
 
Condition III:  Wartime/Increased Tension/Forward Deployed 
Cruising Readiness 
Reduced defensive systems are manned to a level sufficient 
to counter pop-up threats.  While in Condition III, the ship 
shall be capable of meeting the following criteria: able to 
keep installed systems manned and operating as necessary to 
conform with prescribed ROCs; able to accomplish all normal 
underway maintenance, support and administrative functions.  
To determine manpower requirements, the minimum expected crew 
endurance for Condition III is 60 days, with opportunity for 8 
hours of rest provided per man per day.  
 
Condition IV:  Training Cruising Readiness 
While in Condition IV, the ship shall be capable of meeting 
the following criteria: able to keep installed systems manned 
and operating only to the extent necessary for safe and 
effective ship control, propulsion and security; able to 
accomplish all normal underway maintenance, support and 
administrative functions.  Maximum advantage is taken of 
training and exercise opportunities.  Expected endurance is 
not constrained by personnel.  Ability to immediately change 
readiness posture to Condition I, II or III is expected. 
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Condition V:  In port Readiness 
Designated maintenance and training period.  While in 
Condition V, the ship shall be capable of meeting the 
following criteria: able to keep installed systems manned and 
operating to the extent necessary for effective operation as 
dictated by the existing situation; able to man watch stations 
as required to provide adequate security; able at all times to 
meet anticipated in-port emergencies and to perform in-port 
functions as prescribed by unit ROCs; able to accomplish all 
required maintenance, support, and administrative functions.  
Maximum advantage is taken of training and exercise 
opportunities.  Subject to the foregoing requirements the crew 
will be provided maximum opportunity for rest, leave and 
liberty. 
 
4. ROC symbols are used to specify the desired level 
of achievement of readiness or other work for or during a 
particular readiness condition.  Readiness normally applies 
to watches and/or evolutions, while other work refers to 




"F" = "Full"  The capability is to be fully achieved.  For operational 
functions (watches), this means that installed equipment or systems will be fully 
manned to design capability.  For support functions, sufficient manning is provided to 
ensure effective accomplishment of all included tasks.  The achievement is to be 
sustained for the duration of the condition unless modified by an "A" or "E." 
 
"L" = "Limited"  The capability is to be only partially realized.  (Note:  
“P” for “Partial” is no longer a symbol.).  Even though only limited capability is 
realized, it is to be sustained for the duration of the condition unless modified by 
an "A" or "E."  A limiting statement specifying the limitation must support every “L”. 
 
MODIFIERS 
"A" = "Augmentation"  The capability is to be either fully or partially 
achieved for a limited time during the condition.  The capability is achieved by using 
off-watch or off-duty personnel to achieve the required degree of capability.  This 
symbol is always associated with an "F" or "L” and establishes a requirement for 
personnel to be trained, available and on call to augment existing watch stations as 
required. 
 
"E" = "Special Team"  The capability is to be either fully or partially 
achieved for a limited time during the condition.  The capability is achieved by using 
off-watch special teams or details.  This symbol is always associated with an "F" or 
"L" and denotes a capability that does not require continuous watch manning.  Teams 
and details as set may either supplement or replace all or part of the existing watch 




MODIFIER FULL LIMITED 
None ¾ Manned to design capacity 
for duration of 
condition 















E ¾ Temporarily manned to 
design capacity 
using a special 
team 
Temporarily 
manned to less 
than design 
capacity using 
a special team 
 
 
Ship's Company and External Personnel Resources.  Normally, 
using an "A" or an "E" requires no embellishing statement as 
their meanings are predefined.  However, in the case of the 
FFG as well as other classes that routinely embark external 
resources, the meaning may not be clear as to whether ship’s 
company or the external resource should provide the 
augmentation. 
 
This ROC/POE instruction shows: 
 
¾ If the resource is ship's company, no elaboration or 
statement is provided. 
¾ If the resource is external for "F," a Note is added 
to the ROC stating the resource. 
¾ If the resource is external for "L," the resource is 






REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
 
LCS XXCLASS I III IV V 
ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW)     
AAW 1 PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE INDEPENDENTLY OR IN 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER FORCES. 
    
AAW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using missile, gun, electronic or 
physical systems (e.g., chaff, flares).  
 
NOTE:  No missile capabilities. 
 
III(L) - Man MK 92 FCS and 76 mm mount (without 
magazine crew).  CIWS operated by WCC Operator. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
AAW 1.3 Coordinate air defense planning and act as AAW 
Commander (AAWC) for joint/BG/convoy/expeditionary/ 
amphibious/replenishment operations. 
 
NOTE:  Functioning as AAWC may limit capabilities in 
other primary warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) - Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
AAW 1.7 Engage air targets during joint/group operations. 
 
NOTE:  No missile capabilities. 
 
III(L) - Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm mount (without 
magazine crew).  CIWS operated by WCC Operator. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
AAW 1.9 Plan/direct engagement of targets during group operations 
in cooperation with naval/joint/combined forces. 
 
NOTE: Plan/direct engagement of targets of a small area/ 
group operations may limit capabilities in other primary 
warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) – Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
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AAW 6 DETECT, IDENTIFY AND TRACK AIR TARGETS.     
AAW 6.1  Measure aircraft altitude by fade chart. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
AAW 6.2  Recognize by sight friendly and enemy aircraft. 
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
F L L  
AAW 6.3 Maintain an accurate air plot.  
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
AAW 6.4 Measure aircraft altitude by radar. F F F  
AAW 6.5 Detect, identify and track air targets with radar and/or 
cooperative sensors. 
F F F  
AAW 6.6 Acquire and track air targets with Gunfire Control 
Systems/Missile Fire Control Systems (GFCS/MFCS). 
 
NOTE:  Missile Fire Control System not functional. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F/A L 
AAW 6.13 Identify air targets as friendly/non-friendly using 
transponder interrogation equipment. 
 
V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F F L 
AAW 9 ENGAGE AIRBORNE THREATS USING SURFACE-TO-AIR 
ARMAMENT. 
    
AAW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne threats with gunfire. 
 
III(L) - Man MK 92 FCS and 76 mm mount (without 
magazine crew).  CIWS operated by WCC Operator. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
AAW 9.5 Engage airborne threats using installed anti-air weapons. 
 
NOTE:  No missile capabilities. 
 
III(L) - Man MK 92 FCS and 76 mm mount (without 
magazine crew).  CIWS operated by WCC Operator. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
AAW 9.6 Engage airborne threats utilizing soft-kill weapons systems 
(i.e., chaff/decoys). 
 
III(L) – MK 50 DLS not manned. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
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AAW 9.7 Engage airborne threats using portable missile systems. 
 
NOTE:  Only when portable missile system detachment 
embarked. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L L 
AAW 11 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S AAW EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
AAW 12 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S AAW CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man Combat System Operational Sequencing 
System (CSOSS) watch organization with CSOOW/Combat 
Systems Maintenance Supervisor and Electronics Support 
Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (AMW)     
AMW 12 PROVIDE AIR CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF AIR 
OPERATIONS IN THE AOA. 
    
AMW 12.2 Provide coordination of AAW, ASU and ASW air assets for 
protection of the force in the AOA. 
 
NOTE:  Functioning as AAWC may limit capabilities in 
other primary warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) - Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
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AMW 12.3 Control search and rescue (SAR) air operations in the AOA.
 
NOTE:  Functioning as AAWC may limit capabilities in 
other primary warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) - Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
AMW 12.4 Coordinate air assets in the AOA with Supporting Arms to 
prevent conflicting actions. 
 
NOTE:  Functioning as AAWC may limit capabilities in 
other primary warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) - Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
AMW 15 PROVIDE AIR OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS 
OPERATIONS 
    
AMW 15.1 Launch fixed wing and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as Own Unit Support (OUS) and only supports logistic 
helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
AMW 15.2 Recover fixed wing and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
AMW 15.9 Load/unload ordnance within required aircraft turnaround 
times. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
97
LCS XXCLASS I III IV V 
AMW 20 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S AMW EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space.   
L F F F 
AMW 43 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S AMW CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man Combat System Operational Sequencing 
System (CSOSS) watch organization with CSOOW/Combat 
Systems Maintenance Supervisor and Electronics Support 
Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
ANTISURFACE SHIP WARFARE (ASU)     
ASU 1 USING ANTISURFACE ARMAMENTS, ENGAGE SURFACE 
THREATS. 
    
ASU 1.5 Engage surface ships with intermediate caliber gunfire (i.e., 
3”/75, 76mm). 
 
III(L) - Man 76 mm mount (without magazine crew). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 1.6 Engage surface ships with minor caliber gunfire (i.e., 
25mm, 20mm, .50 cal.) 
 
NOTE:  Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 1.9 Engage surface ships with small arms gunfire. 
 
NOTE:  Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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ASU 1.10 Conduct close-in surface self-defense using crew operated 
machine guns (i.e., 25mm, 20mm, .50 cal, .30 cal). 
 
NOTE:  Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
 
III(L) – Man self-defense weapons by using off-watch 
personnel or stand down other non-essential functions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L/E L L 
ASU 1.11 Employ self-defense torpedo countermeasures using: 
 
(a) NIXIE 
(zz) Other - LEAD/ADC’s 
 
NOTE:  Streaming and retrieval of NIXIE performed by 
standing down other Condition I watch stations or using off-
watch personnel during Condition III. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
ASU 1.12 Plan/direct engagement of surface threats. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 1.14 Direct embarked or non-organic armed helo to engage 
surface ships. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L  
ASU 2 ENGAGE SURFACE TARGETS IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER 
FORCES. 
    
ASU 2.1 Conduct ASU as a member of a multiship CSG, SAG, 
URG, or amphibious force [e.g., ESG, ARG(MEU)]. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
III, IV(L) – Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm Gun Mount 
(without magazine crew). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 2.2 Conduct ASU to support surface forces. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
III, IV(L) – Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm Gun Mount 
(without magazine crew). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
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ASU 2.3 Engage surface targets within assigned antisurface sector. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
III, IV(L) – Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm Gun Mount 
(without magazine crew). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 2.5 Plan/direct engagement of surface targets during group 
operations by surface, subsurface and/or air assets or in 
coordination with naval/joint/combined forces. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 3 PROVIDE ASU DEFENSE OF A GEOGRAPHICAL AREA (E.G., 
AOA, BARRIER) INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COOPERATION 
WITH OTHER FORCES. 
    
ASU 3.1 Provide ASU defense of a geographic area. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
III, IV(L) – Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm Gun Mount 
(without magazine crew). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 4 DETECT, IDENTIFY, LOCALIZE AND TRACK SURFACE SHIP 
TARGETS. 
    
ASU 4.1 Detect, localize and track surface contacts with radar. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASU 4.3 Detect, localize and track surface contacts with active sonar.
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F/A L 
ASU 4.4 Detect, identify, classify and track surface contacts visually.
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
F L L  
ASU 4.6 Detect, identify, classify and track surface contacts by ESM.
 
III(L) - ESM Operator only.  System operation primarily for 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) defense. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 4.7 Identify surface contacts. 
 
NOTE:  Full capability requires augmentation from off-
watch personnel. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
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ASU 4.9 Detect, localize, classify and track surface contacts with 
tactical towed arrays. 
 
NOTE:  TMA requires augmentation from off-watch 
personnel. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/E F/E L 
ASU 5 CONDUCT ACOUSTIC WARFARE (AW) AGAINST SURFACE 
CONTACTS. 
    
ASU 5.1 Employ Acoustic Warfare Support Measures (ACSM) 
against surface contacts. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 5.2 Employ Acoustic Countermeasures (ACM) against surface 
contacts. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 5.4 Plan/direct employment of ACSM, ACM and/or Acoustic 
Counter-countermeasures (ACCM) against surface contacts.
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 6 DISENGAGE, EVADE AND AVOID SURFACE ATTACK.     
ASU 6.1 Employ countermeasures. 
 
(a) Surface decoys 
(b)  Lighting configuration 
(c)  Hull markings 
 
III, IV(L) – MK 50 DLS not manned. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASU 6.2 Employ evasion techniques. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASU 6.3 Employ EMCON procedures. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASU 6.4 Detect, identify and track surface targets to perform contact 
avoidance using Electronic Support Measures (ESM) or 
Radio Direction Finding (RDF/Combat DF/OUTBOARD). 
 
III(L) - ESM Operator only.  System operation primarily for 
ASCM defense. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
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ASU 8 PROVIDE AIR OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT SURFACE ATTACKS.     
ASU 8.1 Launch fixed and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
ASU 8.2 Recover fixed and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
ASU 8.5 Provide conventional ordnance within required aircraft 
turnaround times. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASU 8.8 Control aircraft under all conditions of active jamming. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 8.9 Load/unload ordnance within required aircraft turnaround 
times. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASU 8.10 Provide air strike control to direct or assist attack aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Function performed by Antisubmarine Tactical Air 
Controller (ASTAC) and will require standing down other 
air control functions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 8.11 Conduct Precision Radar Controlled Approaches (PRCA) 
for aircraft under all weather conditions. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F/A L 
ASU 8.12 Plan/direct air operations to support surface attacks. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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ASU 8.13 Control fixed wing or rotary wing ASU aircraft during 
coordinated search or attack operations including Over the 
Horizon Targeting (OTHT). 
 
NOTE:  Function performed by ASTAC and will require 
standing down other air control functions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 8.14 Render safe hazardous explosive ordnance during flight 
operations and ordnance loading/unloading evolutions. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASU 8.15 Provide air strike control to direct or assist naval, combined 
or joint attack aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Function performed by ASTAC and will require 
standing down other air control functions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 10 CONDUCT AIRBORNE OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT SURFACE 
ATTACK OPERATIONS. 
    
ASU 10.5 Provide OTHT information to support air ASU operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 10.6 Plan/direct airborne operations to support group or 
naval/joint/combined ASU operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 11 PERFORM DUTIES OF AIRCRAFT CONTROL UNIT (ACU) FOR 
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ASU OPERATIONS. 
    
ASU 11.1 Perform aircraft control for aircraft involved in ASU 
operations. 
 
NOTE:  Function performed by ASTAC and will require 
standing down other air control functions. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASU 12 SUPPORT/CONDUCT ESCORTING AND INDEPENDENT ASU 
OPERATIONS. 
    
ASU 12.1 Conduct ASU operations while escorting a convoy and/or 
URG. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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ASU 12.2 Conduct ASU operations while escorting an amphibious 
force [e.g., ESG, ARG(MEU)]. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 12.3 Conduct independent ASU operations. 
 
NOTE:  Limited to gun and helo capabilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 13 CONDUCT PREATTACK DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF ASU 
OPERATIONS. 
    
ASU 13.1 Perform preattack deception in support of ASU operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASU 14 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S ASU EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
ASU 17 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S ASU CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man CSOSS watch organization with 
CSOOW/Combat Systems Maintenance Supervisor and 
Electronics Support Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW)     
ASW 1 PROVIDE ASW DEFENSE FOR SURFACE FORCES, GROUPS 
AND UNITS. 
    
ASW 1.1 Defend a convoy (military or mercantile). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 1.2 Defend a BG or task force. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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ASW 1.3 Defend amphibious forces or an URG. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 1.5 Operate in associated support of surface forces. 
 
(a) Picket 
(b) Choke point patrol 
(c)  Barrier patrol 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 1.6 Operate independently as a Search and Attack Unit (SAU). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2 PROVIDE ASW DEFENSE OF A GEOGRAPHIC AREA.     
ASW 2.1 Operate as an open ocean or choke point ASW 
search/barrier unit. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2.3 Operate as an AOA ASW defense barrier unit. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2.4 Defend a group or groups operating in a fixed geographic 
area (e.g., AOA). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2.5 Sanitize an area of threat submarines in preparation for use 
by a surface force. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2.8 Operate as a littoral water ASW barrier. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 2.9 Conduct shallow water ASW operations (less than 100 
fathoms). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 3  CONDUCT INDEPENDENT ASW OPERATIONS.     
ASW 3.1 Support/conduct area search and destroy operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 3.2 Support/conduct vectored intercept operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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ASW 5 PROVIDE FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AIRBORNE 
ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS. 
    
ASW 5.1 Launch fixed wing aircraft and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
ASW 5.2 Recover fixed wing aircraft and/or rotary wing aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
ASW 5.4 Provide conventional ordnance within required aircraft 
turnaround times. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASW 5.6 Conduct operations during all EMCON conditions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 5.7 Load/unload ordnance within required aircraft turnaround 
times. 
 
NOTE:  Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASW 5.8 Control aircraft under all conditions of active jamming. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASW 5.13 Render safe hazardous explosive ordnance during flight 
operations and ordnance loading/unloading evolutions  
 
NOTE: Ship’s force not certified for aviation ordnance 
handling; requires aviation detachment personnel. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F/E F/E L/E  
ASW 5.14 Conduct PRCA for embarked/controlled fixed wing aircraft 
or helos under all weather conditions. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F/A L 
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ASW 6 ENGAGE SUBMARINES INDEPENDENTLY OR IN 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER FORCES. 
    
ASW 6.1 Operate as a member of a multiship SAU. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 6.2 Operate as a member of a combined surface and aviation 
SAU. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 6.4 Detect, localize and track subsurface contacts with active 
sonar. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASW 6.5 Detect, localize, classify and track subsurface contacts with 
passive sonar. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
ASW 6.6  Detect, localize and track subsurface contacts with active 
sonobuoys. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 6.7 Detect, localize, classify and track subsurface contacts with 
passive sonobuoys. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 6.8  Detect, localize and track subsurface contacts which are at 
periscope depth visually or with radar. 
 
III, IV(L) – Visual capability provided by the Bridge watch 
team and Aft lookout. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASW 6.9 Detect, localize, classify and track submarines assisted by 
real time passive acoustic analysis. 
 
NOTE:  TMA requires augmentation from off-watch 
personnel. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/E F/E L 
ASW 6.10 Classify subsurface contacts. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
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ASW 6.12 Detect, localize, classify and track subsurface contacts with 
Tactical Towed Arrays. 
 
NOTE:  TMA requires augmentation from off-watch 
personnel. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/E F/E L 
ASW 6.14 Detect, identify, classify and track subsurface contacts that 
are at periscope depth by ESM. 
 
III(L) - EW Supervisor and ESM Operator positions only.  
Location and targeting require TMA augmentation. 
 
IV(L) - ESM Operator only. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASW 7 ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH ANTISUBMARINE ARMAMENT.     
ASW 7.6 Attack with torpedoes. 
 
NOTE:  Full capability for torpedo attack is provided by on-
call TM with SVTT loaded and charged. 
 
IV, V(L) - plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 7.9 Attack with guns. 
 
III(L) - Man MK 92 FCS and 76mm mount (without gun or 
magazine crew). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
ASW 7.11 Attack with conventional air-to-surface ordnance. 
 
I, III(L) - Direct armed helo or fixed-wing aircraft. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
ASW 7.12 Plan/direct attack of submarines.  
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 8 DISENGAGE, EVADE, AVOID AND DECEIVE SUBMARINES.     




(zz) Other - LEAD/ADC’s 
 
NOTE:  Streaming and retrieval of NIXIE performed by 
standing down other Condition I watch stations or using off-
watch personnel during Condition III. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
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ASW 8.2 Employ ACM against submarines. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 8.3 Employ ACCM against submarines. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 8.4 Conduct deception operations in support of ASW 
operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 9 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S ASW EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
ASW 10 PERFORM DUTIES OF AIRCRAFT CONTROL UNIT (ACU) FOR 
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS 
(REQUIRES ANTISUBMARINE AIR CONTROLLERS (ASACS)). 
    
ASW 10.1 Control fixed wing and/or rotary wing ASW aircraft in 
conjunction with coordinated search and/or attack 
operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 10.2 Control helicopter screen. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 10.3 Provide positive and/or advisory control of ASW aircraft. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 10.4 Function as MPA Control Unit (MPACU). 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
ASW 13 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S ASW CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man CSOSS watch organization with 
CSOOW/Combat Systems Maintenance Supervisor and 
Electronics Support Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
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COMMAND AND CONTROL AND 
COMMUNICATIONS (CCC) 
    
CCC 2  COORDINATE AND CONTROL THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
TASK ORGANIZATION OR FUNCTIONAL FORCE TO CARRY 
OUT ASSIGNED MISSIONS. 
 
NOTE:  Concurrent assignment of multiple Commander 
functions is not recommended because ship is not 
configured for embarked staff. 
    
CCC 2.1 Coordinate the reconnaissance of multiple surface, 
subsurface and/or air contacts. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F/A L 
CCC 2.2 Function as AAWC for force or sector. 
 
NOTE:  Functioning as AAWC may limit capabilities in 
other primary warfare areas. 
 
I, III(L) - Capable of functioning as AAWC for a limited 
duration in emergent situations for a small area/group 
operations only. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
CCC 2.3 Function as ASW commander (ASWC) for force or sector. 
 
I, III(L) - Can accomplish only for short periods of time if 
assigned other Command/Coordination responsibilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
CCC 2.4 Function as SAU or SAG commander. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 2.5 Operate as contact area commander to coordinate multitype 
search and attack operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 2.6 Function as force or sector Officer in Tactical Command 
(OTC)/Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC) (or 
alternate) to coordinate and control BG/task force 
operations. 
 
I, III(L) - Can accomplish only for short periods of time if 
assigned other Command/Coordination responsibilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
CCC 2.8 Function as on-scene commander for a SAR operation. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
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CCC 2.11 Control close air support aircraft in support of amphibious 
operations in coordination with other supporting arms. 
 
NOTE:  Function performed by ASTAC and will require 
standing down other air control functions. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 2.12 Coordinate and control air SAR operations in the AOA. 
 
I, III(L) - Back up TACGRU or TACRON. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
CCC 2.15 Function as one or more of the following coordinators for 
force or sector. 
 
(d) Screen coordinator (SC) 
(e) Electronic warfare coordinator (EWC) 
(f) Force air track coordinator 
(g) Force surface track coordinator (FSTC) 
(h) Force track coordinator (FTC) 
(j)  Force OTH track coordinator (FOTC) 
(n) Helicopter element command (HEC) 
 
I, III, IV(L) - Unable to perform all functions 
simultaneously. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L/A L 
CCC 2.16 Assist in the planning of AAW, ASU and ASW for the 
coordination of air operations in the AOA. 
F F F F 
CCC 2.18 Function as an Anti-Surface Warfare Commander 
(ASUWC) for force or sector. 
 
I, III(L) - Can accomplish only for short periods of time if 
assigned other Command/Coordination responsibilities. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
CCC 3 PROVIDE OWN UNIT'S COMMAND AND CONTROL 
FUNCTIONS. 
    
CCC 3.1 Maintain a CIC or CDC capable of collecting, processing, 
displaying, evaluating and disseminating tactical 
information. 
F F F F 
CCC 3.3 Provide all personnel services, programs and facilities to 
safeguard classified material and information. 
F F F F 
CCC 3.4 Carry out emergency destruction of classified material and 
equipment rapidly and efficiently. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
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CCC 3.5 Employ Identification Friend or Foe/Selective Identification 
Feature (IFF/SIF) including secure IFF Mode 4. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 3.7 Maintain a CIC or CDC capable of supporting a TAO. F F F F 
CCC 4 MAINTAIN NAVY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (NTDS) OR DATA 
LINK CAPABILITY. 
    
CCC 4.3 Transmit/receive and support Link 11. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.4 Receive data link information from airborne ASW aircraft. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.5 Receive and process data link information from Satellite 
Communication (SATCOM). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.6 Receive and process data link information from high 
frequency (HF) systems. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.11 Receive data link tracks from airborne AAW aircraft. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.12 Manage, coordinate and direct air assets (airwing, group or 
joint aircraft) in ASUW/STW using data links. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 4.13 Transmit/Receive data via Global Command and Control 
System - Maritime (GCCS-M). 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
CCC 6 PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS FOR OWN UNIT.     
CCC 6.1 Maintain tactical voice communications. 
 
V(L) - Communications on harbor common and other voice 
circuits as directed. 
F F F L/A 
CCC 6.2 Maintain visual communications. 
 
I(L) - Work one contact and maintain log. 
 
III, IV(L) – Initial limited response to visual signal provided 
by Bridge area watch team.  Experienced visual specialist 
on-call. 
 
V(L) - Work one contact for administrative traffic. 
L L L L/A 
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CCC 6.3 Maintain multichannel cryptographically covered 
teletype/data receive circuits. 
F F F  
CCC 6.5 Maintain full duplex cryptographically covered HF 
teletype/data circuits (simplex for submarines and patrol 
combatants). 
F F F F/A 
CCC 6.6 Process messages. F F F F 
CCC 6.7 Maintain underwater communications. F F F  
CCC 6.8 Maintain automatic relay communications. F F F F/A 
CCC 6.10 Maintain voice/teletype/computer data cryptographically 
covered satellite communication circuits. 
F F F F/A 
CCC 6.11 Establish and maintain fixed combat communications and 
relay support for NSW operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 6.12 Maintain internal communications systems. F F F F 
CCC 6.13 Maintain capability for Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) 
HF communications. 
F F F  
CCC 6.14 Maintain capability for LPI satellite communications. F F F  
CCC 6.15 Maintain frequency database. F F F F 
CCC 6.19 Maintain tactical, secure voice or data communications. F F F F/A 
CCC 6.21 Provide Officer-in-Tactical Command Information 
Exchange Subsystem (OTCIXS). 
F F F F/A 
CCC 9 RELAY COMMUNICATIONS.     
CCC 9.1 Relay visual communications. 
 
I(L) - Work one contact and maintain log. 
 
III, IV(L) - Initial limited response to visual signal provided 
by Bridge area watch team.  Experienced visual specialist 
on-call. 
 
V(L) - Work one contact for administrative traffic. 
L L L L/A 
CCC 9.2 Relay acoustic communications. F F   
CCC 9.3 Relay electronic communications. 
 
V(L) - Capability limited to single point-to-point circuit. 
F F/A F/A L/A 
CCC 11 CONDUCT ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING CONTROL 
FUNCTIONS: 
    
CCC 11.1 MPACU. 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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CCC 11.2 Air Raid Reporting Control Ship (ARRCS). 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 11.3 Aircraft Control Unit for AAW, ASW, ASU and/or STW. 
 
I, III(L) – Capabilities limited due to reduction of air 
controllers on board. 
  
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
L L/A L L 
CCC 11.4 Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ)/Strike 
Support Ship. 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 11.5 NTDS Link 11 Net Control Ship/Station (NCS). 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train. 
F F L L 
CCC 19 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S CCC EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
CCC 20 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S CCC CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man CSOSS watch organization with 
CSOOW/Combat Systems Maintenance Supervisor and 
Electronics Support Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) AND 
INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) 
    
C2W 1 CONDUCT ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT (ES) 
OPERATIONS. 
    
C2W 1.1 Search for and intercept electromagnetic and directed 
energy signals and emissions. 
 
I, III, IV(L) - Location and targeting of non-communication 
emitters requires TMA/plotting team per C2W 1.4. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
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C2W 1.2 Identify Command and Control (C2) and weapons systems’ 
signals. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 1.3 Identify threat platforms' communications and weapons 
signal sources. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 1.4 Provide location or targeting information of threat 
weapons/C2/platforms/signal sources. 
 
I, III, IV(L) - TMA/plotting team personnel required for 
non-communication emitters only. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
C2W 1.5 Provide timely threat alert for actions involving Electronic 
Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), EMCON, avoidance, 
deception and targeting.  
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 1.6 Conduct ES for self-defense. 
 
NOTE:  Conduct EP and EA. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
C2W 1.8 Identify and coordinate tactical C2W information 
requirements and disseminate information derived from ES 
and other sources to CWC, warfare commanders and 
naval/combined/joint forces. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 2 CONDUCT ELECTRONIC ATTACK (EA) OPERATIONS.     
C2W 2.2 Conduct electronic jamming of target acquisition/target 
tracking/fire control/missile seeker radars. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
C2W 2.7 Conduct electronic deception of target acquisition/target 
tracking/fire control/missile seeker radars. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
C2W 3 CONDUCT ELECTRONIC PROTECTION (EP)  OPERATIONS.     
C2W 3.1 Detect, identify, and protect against electronic jamming of 
electromagnetically controlled and/or dependent systems. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
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C2W 3.2 Detect, identify and protect against electronic deception of 
electromagnetically controlled and/or dependent systems. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
C2W 4 PLAN AND IMPLEMENT OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) 
MEASURES. 
    
C2W 4.1 Implement appropriate/ directed electromagnetic/acoustic 
EMCON condition. 
F F F F 
C2W 4.2 Transition rapidly from one EMCON condition to another. F F F F 
C2W 4.3 Monitor own unit compliance with EMCON condition in 
effect. 
F F F F 
C2W 4.4 Monitor task group/force compliance with EMCON 
condition in effect. 
 
I, III, IV(L) - Non-communication emitters only unless 
Combat-DF installed. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
C2W 4.9 Manage electromagnetic/acoustic and/or other emissions to 
minimize mutual interference among friendly systems. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 4.11 Plan, coordinate and control implementation of OPSEC 
measures. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
C2W 14 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S C2W EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
C2W 16 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S C2W CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man CSOSS watch organization with 
CSOOW/Combat Systems Maintenance Supervisor and 
Electronics Support Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
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FLEET SUPPORT OPERATIONS (FSO)     
FSO 1 REPAIR AND OVERHAUL SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED 
EQUIPMENT. 
    
FSO 1.4 Provide inspection, test, calibration and repair services for: 
 
(k) Test measurement and diagnostic equipment. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Requirement applies to own ship's equipment 
only. 
 L L L 
FSO 4 CONDUCT IN-FLIGHT REFUELING.     
FSO 4.1 Provide day/night in-flight refueling for helicopters. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
FSO 6 SUPPORT/CONDUCT SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) 
OPERATIONS IN A COMBAT/NONCOMBAT ENVIRONMENT. 
    
FSO 6.1 Support/conduct combat/noncombat SAR operations by 
fixed or rotary wing aircraft. 
F F F  
FSO 6.2 Conduct combat/noncombat SAR operations by surface 
ships. 
F F F  
FSO 6.4 Recover man overboard. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, search and recovery requires 
augmentation by securing other battle stations.  During 
Condition III, search and recovery requires augmentation 
from off- watch personnel. 
F/E F/E F/E F 
FSO 6.5 Support/perform planeguard/lifeguard functions. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, search and recovery requires 
augmentation by securing other battle stations.  During 
Condition III, search and recovery requires augmentation 
from off- watch personnel. 
F/E F/E F/E  
FSO 6.6 Conduct search and rescue operations (including operations 
involving submarine disasters/rescues). 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, search and recovery requires 
augmentation by securing other battle stations.  During 
Condition III, search and recovery requires augmentation 
from off- watch personnel. 
F/E F/E F/E  
FSO 6.7 Conduct general surveillance. F F F  
FSO 6.8 Acquire and display distress data. F F F  
FSO 6.9 Report situation assessment. F F F  
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FSO 6.10 Coordinate SAR operations. F F F  
FSO 6.11 Conduct multi-unit SAR operations. F F F  
FSO 9 PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE TO ASSIGNED AND EMBARKED 
PERSONNEL. 
    
FSO 9.1 Conduct sick call.  F F F 
FSO 9.4 Conduct basic ward care. 
 
I, III, IV(L) - For use in emergency cases where 
MEDEVAC is not possible or where return to duty can be 
expected in a short time. 
L L L  
FSO 9.5 Conduct sanitation and safety inspections.  F F F 
FSO 9.6 Conduct occupational health/safety and preventive medicine 
programs and training using the following personnel: 
 
(a) Hospital corpsman 
 F F F 
FSO 9.8 Conduct pharmacy services requiring the following 
personnel: 
 
(a) Hospital corpsman 
 F F F 
FSO 9.9 Conduct associated administrative/maintenance services: 
 
(a) Maintain adequate medical supplies for appropriate 
level health care. 
(c) Provide patient/casualty administrative services. 
(d) Perform routine medical administrative services. 
 F F F 
FSO 9.10 Conduct on-site emergency medical treatment during 
hazardous evolutions including flight quarters, underway 
replenishment/refueling and amphibious assault boat 
operations. 
 F/A F/A  
FSO 9.17 Identify, equip and maintain suitable spaces to provide 
medical care. 
F F F F 
FSO 9.19 Provide medical care, triage and resuscitation 
commensurate with health care provider credentials using 
the following personnel: 
 
(a) Independent duty corpsman 
F F F F 
FSO 10 PROVIDE FIRST AID ASSISTANCE.     
FSO 10.1 Identify, equip and maintain appropriate first aid spaces. F F F F 
FSO 10.2 Train assigned and embarked personnel in first aid, self and 
buddy aid procedures. 
 F F F 
FSO 10.3 Train stretcher-bearers.  F F F 
FSO 11 PROVIDE TRIAGE OF CASUALTIES /PATIENTS.     
FSO 11.1 Identify, equip and maintain suitable triage spaces. F F F F 
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FSO 11.2 Train assigned and embarked personnel in triage care.  F F F 
FSO 11.4 Train designated non-medical personnel to assist in triage 
management care for CBR contamination casualties. 
 F F F 
FSO 11.5 Train designated non-medical personnel in CBR casualty 
decontaminated procedures. 
 F F F 
FSO 11.7 Provide medical treatment for chemical, biological 
radiological casualties. 
 
I, III, IV, V(L) - Emergency cases where MEDEVAC is not 
possible or where return to duty can be expected in a short 
time. 
L L L L 
FSO 12 PROVIDE MEDICAL/SURGICAL TREATMENT FOR 
CASUALTIES/PATIENTS. 
    
FSO 12.1 Identify, equip and maintain suitable resuscitation spaces. F F F F 
FSO 12.2 Train assigned and embarked personnel in resuscitation.  F F F 
FSO 12.5 Identify, equip and maintain suitable spaces for emergency 
minor surgery. 
F F F F 
FSO 13 PROVIDE MEDICAL, SURGICAL, POST-OPERATIVE AND 
NURSING CARE FOR CASUALTIES/PATIENTS. 
    




I, III, IV(L) - For use in emergency cases where 
MEDEVAC is not possible or where return to duty can be 
expected in a short time. 
L L L  
FSO 13.7 Provide surgery by Primary Care Medical Officer. 
 
I, III, IV, V(L) - Medical Officer is reserve augmentation 
requirement.  Supporting medical equipment and supplies 
must accompany doctor.  Routine medical service during 
deployment is provided by independent duty corpsman. 
L L L L 
FSO 20 PROVIDE FLEET TRAINING SERVICES.     
FSO 20.1 Act as target for submarines.   F  
FSO 20.5 Act as school ship for gunnery training.   F/A F/A 
FSO 20.6 Act as delivery or receiving ship for underway 
replenishment training. 
  F/E  
FSO 20.8 Recover exercise torpedoes/drones.   F/E  
FSO 20.67 Act as school ship for ASW training.   F/A F/A 
FSO 20.68 Act as school ship for engineering training.   F/A F/A 
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FSO 51 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S FSO-RELATED EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by on-call/off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
FSO 55 MAINTAIN READINESS BY PROVIDING FOR TRAINING OF 
OWN UNITS PERSONNEL. 
 F F F 
INTELLIGENCE (INT)     
INT 1 SUPPORT/CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.     
INT 1.1 Support/conduct electronic intelligence information 
collection. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 1.2 Support/conduct acoustic intelligence information 
collection. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 1.3 Support/conduct imagery intelligence information 
collection. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 1.5 Support/conduct radar intelligence information collection. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 1.7 Collect remote sensor information. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 1.11 Maintain radar scope photography capability. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 2 PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE.     
INT 2.1 Maintain intelligence summary plots on air, surface and 
subsurface activities. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
INT 2.2 Evaluate and disseminate intelligence information. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
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INT 2.4 Establish and maintain access to naval and national 
intelligence sources. 
 
I, III(L) – Only intelligence support is from GCCS-M and 
message traffic. 
 
IV, V(L) – Plan and train.  
L L L L 
INT 3 CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE.     
INT 3.2 Conduct overt surveillance and reconnaissance operations. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 4 CONDUCT OCEAN SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS AGAINST 
TARGETS OF INTEREST. 
    
INT 4.1 Detect and locate targets of interest. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 4.2 Classify and identify targets of interest. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 4.3 Track targets of interest. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 5 PROCESS OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION.     
INT 5.1 Integrate and correlate ocean surveillance information with 
other source information and intelligence 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 6 CONDUCT SURFACE RECONNAISSANCE.     
INT 6.1 Conduct surface patrols or barriers. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 6.3 Conduct reconnaissance of surface forces. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F F L 
INT 6.7 Recognize by sight friendly and enemy aircraft, ships, 
submarines, and potential naval fire support targets which 
may be encountered in the expected operating areas. 
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
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INT 17 REPAIR OWN UNITS INTELLIGENCE-RELATED EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by on-call/off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
INT 19 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT'S INT CAPABILITIES. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
 
III, IV(L) - Man CSOSS watch organization with 
CSOOW/Combat Systems Maintenance Supervisor and 
Electronics Support Supervisor. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
LOGISTICS (LOG)     
LOG 1 CONDUCT UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT.     
LOG 1.12 (U) Replenish other units underway with limited fuel, 
provisions, munitions, potable and feed water. 
 
III, IV(L) – Provide fuel to patrol craft (PC) in company 
after mission-specific contingency astern refueling 
equipment has been temporarily installed and the crew has 
been provided with requisite training. 
 
V(L) – Plan and train. 
 L/E L/E L 
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MINE WARFARE (MIW)     
MIW  4 CONDUCT MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM). 
 
Note:  It is intended that the ship remain outside of mined/ 
suspected waters before and during MCM operations.  
Below capabilities are intended to 1) permit ROV or 
Airborne MCM operations from a standoff position when no 
dedicated MCM assets are available, and 2) to enhance self-
defense capability if providing point defense for dedicated 
MCM assets or if transiting a swept or an unconditional 
channel. 
    
MIW 4.1 Detect, classify and plot sea mines. 
 
NOTE:  Full capability applies only to FFGs equipped with 
specifically designed MCM systems (not including installed 
sonar systems). 
 
I, III(L) - For all other FFGs:  Visually or using installed 
sonar, detect mines for self-defense mine avoidance. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
MIW 4.11 Detect and avoid mines using organic sensors. 
 
I, III(L) - Visually or using installed sonar, detect mines for 
self-defense mine avoidance. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
MIW 6 CONDUCT MAGNETIC SILENCING (DEGAUSSING, 
DEPERMING, ETC.) 
    
MIW 6.7 Maintain magnetic signature limits. F F F F 
MIW 6.8 Maintain own unit's degaussing readiness. F F F F 
MIW 13 REPAIR OWN UNIT'S MIW EQUIPMENT. 
 
NOTE:  During condition III and IV, full capability 
provided by off-watch personnel. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's 
mission.  All critical Combat System spaces manned with at 
least one technician in each space. 
L F F F 
MOBILITY (MOB)     
MOB 1 OPERATE SHIP'S PROPULSION PLANT TO DESIGNED 
CAPABILITY. 
    
MOB 1.1 Operate ship’s propulsion plant at full power. F F F  
MOB 1.2 Operate ship’s propulsion plant with split plant operations F F F  
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MOB 1.5 Operate at sustained BG/SAG/URG/amphibious force 
speeds. 
F F F  
MOB 1.6 Maintain necessary machinery redundancy to enhance 
survival in high threat areas. 
F F F F 
MOB 1.7 Transit at high speed. F F F  
MOB 3 PREVENT AND CONTROL DAMAGE.     
MOB 3.1 Control fire, flooding, electrical, structural, propulsion and 
hull/airframe casualties. 
F F/E F/E F/E 
MOB 3.2 Counter and control chemical, biological and radiological 
(CBR) contaminants/agents. 
F F/E F/E F/E 
MOB 3.3 Maintain security against unfriendly acts. F F F F 
MOB 3.5 Provide damage control security/surveillance. F F F F 
MOB 3.8 Provide emergency breathing devices per ship's allowance. F F F F 
MOB 5 MANEUVER IN FORMATION. 
 
NOTE:  Capability is supported by Officer of the Deck 
(OOD)/Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) and combined 
Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW)/Boatswain’s Mate of 
the Watch (BMOW). 
F F F  
MOB 6 REFUEL IN THE AIR.     
MOB 6.3 Deliver fuel in day/night ship-to-air refueling. 
 
NOTE:  Rotary wing aircraft only.  During Condition I, 
stand down other battle watch stations to man Flight Deck, 
Rescue Boat Detail, and Crash & Salvage Detail.  During 
Condition III, flight deck operations workload is collected 
as OUS and only supports logistic helicopter operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
MOB 7 PERFORM SEAMANSHIP, AIRMANSHIP AND NAVIGATION 
TASKS. 
    
MOB 7.1 Navigate under all conditions of geographic location, 
weather and visibility. 
F F/E F/E  
MOB 7.2 Conduct precision anchoring. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, stand down other battle 
stations.  During Condition III, requires augmentation form 
off-watch personnel. 
F/E F/E F/E  
MOB 7.3 Get underway, moor, anchor and sortie with duty section in 
a safe manner. 
 
V(L) -  Deployed, duty section fully capable.  Not deployed, 
recall of personnel is required. 
   L/E 
MOB 7.5 Utilize programmed evasive steering. 
 
IV(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L  
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MOB 7.6 Abandon/scuttle ship rapidly. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
MOB 7.7 Provide life boat/raft capacity in accordance with unit's 
allowance. 
F F F F 
MOB 7.8 Tow or be towed (towing engine not required). 
 
NOTE:   Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations in Condition I. 
F/E F/E F/E  
MOB 7.9 Operate day and night and under all weather conditions. F F F  
MOB 7.10 Conduct undetected transits. F F F  
MOB 7.15 Operate in a chemically contaminated environment. F F F F 
MOB 7.16 Recover man overboard (shipboard, boat or helicopter). 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, search and recovery requires 
augmentation by securing other battle stations.  During 
Condition III, search and recovery requires augmentation 
from off-watch personnel.  
F/E F/E F/E F 
MOB 10 REPLENISH AT SEA.     
MOB 10.1 Receive vertical replenishment.  F/E F/E  
MOB 10.2 Receive fuel while underway (alongside method).  F/E F/E  
MOB 10.3 Receive munitions and provisions while underway.  F/E F/E  
MOB 10.4 Receive potable and/or feed water while underway.  F/E F/E  
MOB 10.5 Receive COD/VOD aircraft. 
 
NOTE:  VOD aircraft only. 
 F/E F/E  
MOB 10.6 Receive fuel while underway (astern method).  F/E F/E  
MOB 12 MAINTAIN THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF THE CREW.     
MOB 12.1 Ensure all phases of food service operations are conducted 
consistent with approved sanitary procedures and standards.
 
I(L) - Battle messing.  Requires securing food distribution 
personnel from Condition I stations at Commanding 
Officer's discretion. 
L F F F 
MOB 12.2 Ensure the operation of the potable water system in a 
manner consistent with approved sanitary procedures and 
standards. 
F F F F 
MOB 12.3 Monitor and/or maintain the environment to ensure the 
protection of personnel from overexposure to hazardous 
levels of radiation, temperature, noise, vibration and toxic 
substances per current instructions. 
F F F F 
MOB 12.4 Maintain closed atmosphere within prescribed 
specifications. 
F F F F 
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MOB 12.5 Monitor the health and well-being of the crew to ensure that 
habitability is consistent with approved habitability 
procedures and standards. 
 F F F 
MOB 12.6 Ensure the operation and maintenance of all phases of 
shipboard environmental protection systems do not create a 
health hazard and are consistent with other naval directives 
pertaining to the prevention of pollution of the environment.
 F F F 
MOB 12.8 Provide individual protective clothing and equipment to 
sufficiently protect shipboard personnel identified being at 
risk in a CBR-contaminated environment. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
MOB 12.9 Provide individual protective clothing and equipment to 
sufficiently protect assigned medical personnel aboard a 
ship at risk in a CBR-contaminated environment.  
 
III, IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
MOB 12.12 Provide antidotes to ship's company that will counteract the 
effects caused by a CBR-contaminated environment. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F L L L 
MOB 12.13 Train designated medical supervisors and non-medical 
personnel to detect CBR-contaminated casualties. 
 F F F 
MOB 12.14 Train designated non-medical personnel to decontaminate 
CBR casualties. 
 F F F 
MOB 12.15 Identify, supply and maintain decontamination stations. F F F F 
MOB 17 PERFORM ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL REPAIRS TO OWN 
UNIT'S MOB EQUIPMENT. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship’s 
mission.  May require standing down selected personnel 
from their Condition I stations. 
L F F F 
MOB 18 CONDUCT CASUALTY CONTROL PROCEDURES TO 
MAINTAIN/RESTORE OWN UNIT’S MOB CAPABILITIES. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, emergency repairs to 
equipment critical to ship’s mission.  During Condition III 
and IV, immediate response by existing watchstanders with 
complete restoration supported by augmentation from off-
watch personnel. 
 
V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A F/A L 
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MISSIONS OF STATE (MOS)     
MOS 1 PERFORM NAVAL DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE OPERATIONS.     
MOS 1.1 Establish a sovereign, mobile sea base in a forward area. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
MOS 1.2 Conduct force/unit tour for foreign dignitaries.  F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 1.3 Conduct systems/weapons demonstrations for foreign 
dignitaries. 
 F/E F/E F/E 
MOS 1.4 Conduct foreign port calls.    F 
MOS 1.5 Conduct force/unit tours for foreign citizens during port 
calls. 
   F/A 
MOS 1.6 Conduct receptions for foreign dignitaries during port calls.    F/A 
MOS 1.7 Provide volunteers for small project assistance during port 
calls. 
   F/A 
MOS 1.8 Participate in military exercises with allied nations.  F F/A F/A 
MOS 1.9 Participate in military exercises with nonallied nations.  F F/A F/A 
MOS 1.10 Participate in or provide participants for foreign/allied 
commemorative or ceremonial events. 
  F/E F/E 
MOS 1.11 Provide lift of opportunity for foreign or national diplomatic 
material. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Small quantities that do not interfere with the 
regular combat capabilities or logistics load. 
 L L L 
MOS 2  PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.     
MOS 2.1 Deliver relief material. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Small quantities that do not interfere with the 
regular combat capabilities or logistics load. 
 L L L 
MOS 2.2 Provide emergency flooding/fire fighting assistance.  F/E F/E F/E 
MOS 2.4 Provide disaster assistance and evacuation.  F/E F/E F/E 
MOS 2.5 Clear and repair utilities and facilities damaged by natural 
disaster, fire, and civil disturbance; decontaminate CBR 
effects. 
   F/E 
MOS 2.9 Plan, direct and coordinate disaster assistance evacuation.  F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 2.10 Support/provide for the evacuation of noncombatant 
personnel in areas of civil or international crisis. 
 F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 2.11 Support/conduct helicopter/boat evacuation of 
noncombatant personnel as directed by higher authority 
from areas of civil or international crisis. 
 F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 2.12 Provide for embarkation, identification and processing of 
evacuees. 
 F/A F/A F/A 
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MOS 2.13 Provide care, feeding and berthing of  evacuees.  F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 2.14 Provide transportation for evacuees to designated safe 
havens or onward processing centers. 
 F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 2.15 Plan/direct the evacuation of noncombat personnel in areas 
of civil or international crisis in both a permissive and non-
permissive environment (including joint/combined 
operations). 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, stand down other battle stations 
to man Flight Deck, Rescue Boat Detail and Crash & 
Salvage Detail.  During other Conditions of Readiness, in 
addition to flight deck crew, boat detail and crash & salvage 
detail, other off-watch personnel will be required for non-
combat personnel processing. 
F/E F/E F/E F/E 
MOS 3 PERFORM PEACEKEEPING     
MOS 3.2 Provide logistics support for a joint/allied peacekeeping 
force. 
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, stand down other battle stations 
to man Flight Deck, Rescue Boat Detail and Crash & 
Salvage Detail.  During other Conditions of Readiness, in 
addition to flight deck crew, boat detail and crash & salvage 
detail, other off-watch personnel will be required for non-
combat personnel processing. 
F/E F/E F/E F/E 
MOS 3.3 Provide direct participation in a joint/allied peacekeeping 
force within a foreign country/region. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F L L 
MOS 4 PERFORM INTERDICTION     
MOS 4.1 Conduct naval blockade. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
MOS 4.2 Conduct quarantine operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
MOS 4.3 Enforce sanction enforcement operations. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
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MOS 4.4 Conduct Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and or 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations with 
naval/combined /joint forces. 
 
NOTE: FFG capable of initial MIO/VBSS operations.  
However, ship unable to maintain sustained operations or 
security team without support of MIO Detachment. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless MIO Detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
MOS 5 PROVIDE FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) ASSISTANCE     
MOS 5.4 Conduct tactical operations in close cooperation with the 
host nation that focus on neutralizing and destroying the 
insurgent threat in the maritime environment. 
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
F F/A L L 
MOS 8 PROVIDE ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE     
MOS 8.1 Ensure that the physical security of important persons, 
facilities and events meets acceptable standards. 
 F/A F/A F/A 
MOS 8.2 Provide training and advice on how to reduce vulnerability 
to terrorism and other threats, particularly in the maritime 
environment. 
 F F F 
MOS 10  CONDUCT SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AS GOVERNED BY 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH A 
PRESIDENTIAL FINDING AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
 
I, III(L) - Provide covering action for Marine or SOC forces.
 
IV, V(L) - Plan and train. 
L L L L 
NONCOMBAT OPERATIONS (NCO)     
NCO 2 PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR OWN 
UNIT. 
    
NCO 2.1 Provide supply support services. 
 
I(L) - Provide emergency supply support only. 
L F F F 
NCO 2.2 Provide clerical services.  F F F 
NCO 2.3 Provide disbursing services.  F F F 
NCO 2.4 Provide post office services.  F F F 
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NCO 2.5 Provide messing facilities. 
 
I(L) - Battle messing requires securing food distribution 
personnel from Condition I stations at Commanding 
Officer's discretion. 
L F F F 
NCO 2.6 Provide ships service facilities.  F F F 
NCO 2.7 Provide inventory and custodial services.  F F F 
NCO 2.8 Provide personnel for living space maintenance.  F F F 
NCO 2.9 Provide personnel for area command security. F F F F 
NCO 2.11 Provide personnel for fuels support. F F F F 
NCO 3 PROVIDE UPKEEP AND MAINTENANCE OF OWN UNIT.     
NCO 3.1 Provide organizational level preventive maintenance.  F F F 
NCO 3.2 Provide organizational level corrective maintenance. 
 
I(L) - Emergency repairs to equipment critical to ship's  
missions.  May require standing down selected personnel 
from their Condition I stations. 
L F F F 
NCO 3.3 Provide small arms storage area. F F F F 
NCO 3.4 Maintain preservation and cleanliness of topside and 
internal spaces. 
 F F F 
NCO 3.5 Provide for proper storage, handling, use and transfer of 
hazardous materials. 
 F F F 
NCO 4 PROVIDE CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION SUPPORT FOR OWN 
UNIT. 
 F F F 
NCO 5 CONDUCT METEOROLOGICAL, HYDROGRAPHIC AND/OR 
OCEANOGRAPHIC COLLECTION OPERATIONS OR SURVEYS. 
    
NCO 5.1 Collect and disseminate meteorological information. F F F F 
NCO 5.2 Collect and disseminate hydrographic information. 
 
NOTE:   Depth only. 
F F F  
NCO 5.3 Collect and disseminate oceanographic information 
including bathythermograph operations. 
F F F  
NCO 7 PROVIDE SPECIAL TECHNICAL RESEARCH.     
NCO 7.1 Serve as a platform for special technical research operations.  F F F 
NCO 7.2 Conduct special technical research operations. 
 
III, IV, V(L)  - Embarkation of technical support personnel 
required. 
 L L L 
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NCO 8 SERVE AS A PLATFORM FOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND 
EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, AND TACTICS 
    
NCO 8.1 Provide technical assistance for installed test and evaluation 
equipment. 
 F F F 
NCO 8.2 Perform the test and evaluation functions set forth in the 
appropriate test plans. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Support projects as required with ship's 
company as long as primary mission areas are not degraded.
 L/A L/A L/A 
NCO 8.3 Perform the evaluation functions set forth in appropriate 
TACMEMOS. 
 
III, IV, V(L) - Support projects as required with ship's 
company as long as primary mission areas are not degraded.
 L/A L/A L/A 
NCO 8.4 Provide range safety as set forth in appropriate test plans 
during missile operational tests. 
 F F  
NCO 10 PROVIDE EMERGENCY/DISASTER ASSISTANCE.     
NCO 10.1 Provide emergency flooding/fire fighting assistance to 
another unit. 
 
I(L) - Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/E F/E F/E F/E 
NCO 10.4 Provide disaster assistance and evacuation. 
 
I(L) - Requires securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/A F/A F/A F/A 
NCO 11 SUPPORT/PROVIDE FOR THE EVACUATION OF 
NONCOMBATANT PERSONNEL IN AREAS OF CIVIL OR 
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. 
    
NCO 11.1 Support/conduct helicopter/boat evacuation of 
noncombatant personnel as directed by higher authority 
from areas of civil or international crisis. 
 
I(L) - May require securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/E F/E F/E F/E 
NCO 11.2 Provide for embarkation, identification and processing of 
evacuees. 
 
I(L) - May require securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/A F/A F/A F/A 
NCO 11.3 Provide care, feeding and berthing of evacuees. 
 
I(L) - May require securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/A F/A F/A F/A 
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NCO 11.4 Provide transportation for evacuees to designated safe 
havens or onward processing centers. 
 
I(L) - May require securing personnel from other battle 
stations. 
L/A F F  
NCO 16 PROVIDE ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION DEFENSE.     
NCO 16.1 Assimilate and disseminate intelligence on terrorist 
activities directed at U.S. Navy installations, ships and 
personnel. 
F F F F 
NCO 16.2 Request and/or provide a threat assessment. F F F F 
NCO 16.3 Declare general warnings of possible terrorist activity 
(THREATCON). 
F F F F 
NCO 16.4 Anticipate and provide defenses against terrorist activities 
directed at ships, installations, facilities and personnel. 
 
(a) Include provisions for barriers, access control, 
surveillance, intruder detection, and electronic security 
systems. 
(b) Train and exercise the unit’s AT response force to 
include tactical room/space entry. 
(c) Implement local FPCON measures. 
(d) Implement unit terrorist incident response plan. 
(e) Operate electronic security systems (ESS). 
(f) Operate duress systems. 
(g) Train and exercise designated marksman for defense of 
HVA, boat crews and security personnel. 
 F F F 
NCO 16.5 Conduct screening of non-assigned personnel and materials 
entering the unit or facility using: 
 
(a) Logical means (validation of identification, 
documentation, personal recognition, etc.) 
(b) Physical means (searches, metal detection, explosive 
detection, etc.) 
 F F F 
NCO 16.6 Provide waterside barriers/patrols during port calls and 
anchorage. 
 
NOTE:  May require rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) and 
crews.  May require augmentation by Mobile Security 
Detachment (MSD). 
 F/E F/E F/E 
NCO 16.7 Determine, maintain and enforce port, harbor and anchorage 
limited access areas. 
 
NOTE:  May require rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) and 
crews.  May require augmentation by MSD. 
 F/E F/E F/E 
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NCO 16.8 Conduct surveillance and interdiction operations of 
swimmers/swimmer delivery vehicles. 
 
NOTE:  May require rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) and 
crews.  May require augmentation by MSD. 
 F/E F/E F/E 
NCO 16.9 Provide AT information and voluntary training to 
dependents visiting units in foreign ports/locations. 
   F 
NCO 16.10 Publish/Disseminate anti-terrorism defense instructions that 
include provisions for appropriate perimeter barriers, access 
control, surveillance and intruder detection, AT response 
force including a crisis action team, and evacuation. 
 F F F 
NCO 16.11 Conduct hostage survival and Code of Conduct training.  F F F 
NCO 16.12 Direct, conduct and assess unit AT exercises consistent with 
potential and/or actual threat environment. 
 F F F 
NCO 19 CONDUCT MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. 
 
NOTE:  For those requirements involving interdiction, visit, 
board, search and seizure of vessels the FFG is capable of 
initial operations.  However, sustained operations and or 
maintenance of a security team require embarked law 
enforcement personnel (i.e., Coast Guard detachment or 
MIO detachment). 
    
NCO 19.1 Detect and identify noncombatant vessels. F F F F 
NCO 19.2 Conduct boarding and inspection of noncombatant vessels. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 19.3 Provide assistance to other law enforcement forces. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
L/E F/E F/E  
NCO 19.4 Provide surveillance and protection of maritime resources. F F F  
NCO 19.6 Conduct seizure of noncombatant vessels. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
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NCO 19.9 Conduct drug traffic suppression and interdiction 
operations. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 19.13 Support enforcement of fisheries law and treaties. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 19.14 Support enforcement of offshore mining and gas/oil drilling 
laws. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 19.15 Support drug traffic suppression and interdiction operations.
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 19.16 Support illegal entry suppression operations. 
 
I(L) - Requires standing down selected watch stations, 
unless law enforcement detachment is embarked. 
 
III, IV(L) - Requires supplement from embarked law 
enforcement personnel/equipment. 
L/E L/E L/E  
NCO 24 SUPPORT/CONDUCT ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.
 
NOTE:  During Condition I, stand down other battle watch 
stations to man Flight Deck, Rescue Boat Detail and Crash 
& Salvage Detail.  During Condition III, flight deck 
operations workload is collected as OUS. 
    
NCO 24.1 Support/conduct day rotary wing aircraft flight operations. F/E F/E F/E  
NCO 24.2 Support/conduct night rotary wing aircraft flight operations. F/E F/E F/E  
NCO 24.3 Support/conduct rotary wing aircraft flight operations 
during all EMCON conditions. 
F/E F/E F/E  
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NCO 24.4 Support/conduct rotary wing aircraft hot and cold refueling 
operations. 
F/E F/E F/E  
NCO 24.5 Provide electrical power for rotary wing aircraft starting, 
testing, etc. 
F/E F/E F/E  
NCO 25 CONDUCT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.     
NCO 25.1 Detect oil or hazardous chemical spill. F F F F 
NCO 25.2 Report spills to proper authority. F F F F 
NCO 25.3 Conduct pollution abatement operations.  F/E F/E F/E 
NCO 32 CONDUCT COUNTERNARCOTIC AND OTHER LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION 
WITH OTHER FORCES. 
    
NCO 32.1 Conduct/support operations with Coast Guard units. F F F  
NCO 32.2 Conduct/support operations with other federal law 
enforcement agencies. 
F F F  
NCO 32.4 Conduct operations with other national governments. F F F  
NCO 33 SUPPORT/PROVIDE COUNTERNARCOTICS AND OTHER LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT PATROL OF A FIXED GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA. 
    
NCO 33.1 Operate as choke point patrol unit. F F F/A  
NCO 33.2 Operate as an open ocean patrol unit. F F F/A  
NCO 34 IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERNARCOTICS AND OTHER LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, DETECT AND MONITOR 
SUSPECT SURFACE CONTACTS.  
    
NCO 34.1 Detect and monitor surface contacts with radar. F F F  
NCO 34.2 Detect and monitor surface contacts visually. 
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
F L L  
NCO 34.3 Detect and monitor surface contacts with infrared 
equipment. 
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
F L L  
NCO 34.4 Detect and monitor surface contacts with electronic 
surveillance methods. 
F F F  
NCO 34.5 Detect and monitor surface contacts with passive sonar. 
 
NOTE:  TMA requires augmentation from off-watch 
personnel. 
F F/E F/E  
NCO 34.6 Detect and monitor surface contacts with active sonar. F F F  
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NCO 34.7 Detect and monitor surface contacts with surveillance towed 
arrays. 
 
NOTE:  TMA requires augmentation from off-watch 
personnel. 
F F/E F/E  
NCO 36 IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERNARCOTICS AND OTHER LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, DETECT AND MONITOR 
SUSPECT AIR CONTACTS. 
    
NCO 36.1 Detect and monitor air contacts with radar. F F F  
NCO 36.2 Detect and monitor air contacts visually. 
 
III, IV(L) – Capability provided by bridge watch team and 
aft lookout. 
F L L  
NCO 36.3 Detect and monitor air contacts by electronic surveillance 
measures. 
F F F  
NCO 37 EMBARK AND SUPPORT LAW ENFORCEMENT 
DETACHMENTS. 
F F/A F/A F/A 
NCO 38 RECEIVE, DISPLAY AND MAINTAIN COUNTERNARCOTIC 
INTELLIGENCE DATA. 
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APPENDIX D. FORMULATION INDICES
0 = N/A
                             1 = CG
                             2 = DDG
                             3 = FFG
                             4 = MCM
     
           
                      
c Class of ship
                        5 = MHC
                             6 = LCS
                             7 = MIW FMP
                             8 = ASW FMP
                             9 = SUW FMP
 
/
                        0 = N/A
                             1 = Executive
                             2 = Operations
                             3 = Combat Systems
     
          d Department Detachment
                        4 = Engineering
                             5 = Supply
                             6 = FMP/Mission C4
                             7 = USV Operator
                             8 = USV Support
                             9 = USV Weapons
                             10 = RMV Oper
                             11 = RMV Support
                             12 = MIW Specialist
                             13 = ASW Specialist
                             14 = SUW Specialist
                             15 = MH-60R & UAV Operator
                             16 = MH-60S & UAV Operator
                             17 = Air Det Composite Support
 
      
0 = N/A
                             1 = Main Gun
                             2 = CIWS
                             3 = .50 Cal
                     
              
                          
s System
        4 = RAM
                             5 = Search RADAR
                             6 = Air Decoy
                             7 = Torpedo Decoy Launcher
                             8 = SONAR
                             9 = Engineering Plant
                             10 = FMP C4
                             11 = Aviation
                             12 = USV 
                             13 = RMV 
                             14 = BPAUV 
                             15 = SCULPIN 
                             16 = EOD 
                             17 = ACES/EER/IEER/AEER family 
                             18 = Torpedo CounterMeasures
                             19 = ADS 
                             20 = Towed Array 
                             21 = Intermediate Cal Gun 
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APPENDIX E. LEGACY SHIP MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
Rate CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
1110 11 11 11 10 9 3 3
1140 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1160 8 8 5 8 4 1 0
1190 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
2100 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3100 3 3 2 2 2 1 0
4100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
6120 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
6130 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
6160 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
6180 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
7120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
7130 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
7440 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
BM 7 8 9 9 9 0 0
CMD 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
CTA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CTM 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
CTO 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
CTR 6 6 0 0 0 0 0
CTT/EW 7 7 7 7 4 0 0
DC 10 8 9 9 6 3 2
DK 2 2 2 2 1 0 0
EM 6 5 5 7 6 5 3
EN 10 10 9 9 10 10 7
ET 16 16 11 14 9 4 3
FC 43 43 39 36 9 0 0
FN 12 9 12 12 4 4 2
GM 13 13 17 13 4 0 0
GS 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
GSE 6 6 7 6 5 0 0
GSM 20 12 19 14 11 0 0
HM 2 2 2 3 2 1 1
HN 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
HT 3 3 4 3 3 1 0
IC 5 5 7 5 3 2 1
IS 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
IT/RM 12 12 14 12 10 5 4
MA 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
MR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
MS/CS 14 14 15 11 10 5 3
NC 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
OS/MN 28 28 31 22 21 20 13
PC 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
PN 4 4 3 3 2 1 0
PO 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
QM 7 7 5 6 4 4 2
RP 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
SH 6 6 7 4 5 0 0
SK 11 11 10 8 8 2 2
SM 0 0 6 1 1 1 1
SN 24 24 31 26 30 12 5
STG 16 16 20 17 11 0 0
TM 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
YN 2 2 6 2 2 1 1
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APPENDIX F. LEGACY CONDITION I CONTROL STATION 
SUMMARY 
Control Station (Officer) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 4 4 3 4 4 3 2
Operations 9 9 6 7 5 1 1
Communications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electronics Casualty 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Weapons 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
ASW/MIW 2 2 0 1 2 1 0
MIO 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Engineering 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Damage 3 2 3 2 1 1 0
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 21 20 15 19 16 8 5
Control Station (Enlisted) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 22 21 24 21 17 11 8
Operations 35 34 27 24 18 4 5
Communications 12 12 11 11 10 4 3
Electronics Casualty 39 39 43 35 13 2 0
Weapons 41 41 37 47 33 4 4
ASW/MIW 34 32 10 29 49 38 20
MIO 24 24 0 24 24 0 0
Engineering 57 50 74 53 43 9 3
Damage 77 64 80 82 65 41 24
Support 8 8 8 5 7 3 2
Total 349 325 314 331 279 116 69
Control Station (Total) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 26 25 27 25 21 14 10
Operations 44 43 33 31 23 5 6
Communications 12 12 11 11 10 4 3
Electronics Casualty 40 40 44 36 13 2 0
Weapons 41 41 37 48 33 5 5
ASW/MIW 36 34 10 30 51 39 20
MIO 24 24 0 25 26 0 0
Engineering 59 52 76 55 45 10 4
Damage 80 66 83 84 66 42 24
Support 8 8 8 5 7 3 2
Total 370 345 329 350 295 124 74
Control Station Min Max Range
Ship 10 27 17
Operations 5 44 39
Communications 3 12 9
Electronics Casualty 0 44 44
Weapons 5 48 43
ASW/MIW 10 51 41
MIO 0 26 26
Engineering 4 76 72
Damage 24 84 60
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APPENDIX G. LEGACY CONDITION III CONTROL STATION 
SUMMARY 
Control Station (Officer) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Operations 5 5 3 4 1 0 0
Communications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electronics Casualty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weapons 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW/MIW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engineering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Damage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 7 7 5 6 3 1 1
Control Station (Enlisted) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 3 3 10 3 4 3 5
Operations 20 20 17 16 9 3 2
Communications 4 4 4 4 2 1 1
Electronics Casualty 3 3 6 6 3 0 0
Weapons 3 3 4 3 0 0 0
ASW/MIW 4 4 5 4 3 0 0
MIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engineering 11 5 7 8 7 5 2
Damage 3 2 3 2 1 0 0
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 51 44 56 46 29 12 10
Control Station (Total) CG(NS) CG(SS) DDG DDG(OME) FFG MCM MHC
Ship 5 5 12 5 6 4 6
Operations 25 25 20 20 10 3 2
Communications 4 4 4 4 2 1 1
Electronics Casualty 3 3 6 6 3 0 0
Weapons 3 3 4 3 0 0 0
ASW/MIW 4 4 5 4 3 0 0
MIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engineering 11 5 7 8 7 5 2
Damage 3 2 3 2 1 0 0
Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 58 51 61 52 32 13 11
Control Station Min Max Range
Ship 4 12 8
Operations 2 25 23
Communications 1 4 3
Electronics Casualty 0 6 6
Weapons 0 4 4
ASW/MIW 0 5 5
MIO 0 0 0
Engineering 2 8 6
Damage 0 3 3
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APPENDIX H. CG (NS) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS 
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 4 13 2 2 1/13 augmented 
Lookouts 0 3 0 1
Steering Aft 0 3 0 0
Signal Bridge 0 3 0 0
Operations Control
Air Control 0 3 0 2
Display and Decision 7 8 5 4
Surface/Subsurfaces 1 5 0 3
Tactical Information 0 9 0 7
CCSS 1 10 0 4
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 8 0 3
Information Security 0 4 0 1
Electronics Casualty Control
Combat Sys Maint Central 1 8 0 1
Computer Rm (SPY 1) 0 2 0 2
EW Equipment Rm 0 2 0 0
SPS 49 Radar Rm 0 3 0 0
SPS 55/Mk 99 Mod 4 xmtr Rm 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 1 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 2 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 3 0 3 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 4 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 5 0 3 0 0
Radio xmtr Rm 0 4 0 0
CIC (SPY 1) 0 2 0 0
Sonar Repair (SQQ-89(v)6) 0 2 0 0
NIXIE Repair 0 1 0 0
Gun Repair 0 1 0 0
Weapons Control
MT 51 Loader Drum Rm 0 2 0 1
MT 51 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
MT 52 Loader Drum Rm 0 2 0 0
MT 52 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
Mk 41 VLS Launcher 0 5 0 1
Tomahawk 0 5 0 1
CIWS MT 1 0 5 0 0
CIWS MT 2 0 4 0 0
Harpoon Missile Sys 0 2 0 0
Total 14 149 7 33
Note:
Condition I Condition III
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
Different from CG SS  
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Control Station
ASW Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Sonar Control (SQQ 89(v)6) 0 6 0 4
Mk 32 SVTT enclosed 0 2 0 0
SQR-19 Control (SQQ 89) 0 1 0 0
Helo Control Station 1 0 0 0
Flight Deck Control 0 6 0 0 6/6 augmented
Ready Life Boat 0 9 0 0 9/9 augmented
RAST Control (LAMPS III) 1 0 0 0 1 LAMP OFF
Crash and Salvage 0 8 0 0 8/8 augmented
AFFF Generator Station 0 1 0 0
JP5 Pump Room 0 1 0 0 1/1 augmented
MIO
Boarding Team (co-manned) 0 15 0 0
Divert Team 0 9 0 0 5/9 augmented
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 2 0 5
ENG Rm Fwd 0 5 0 2
ENG Rm Aft 0 5 0 2
Aux Machinery Rm 1 0 4 0 2
Aux Machinery Rm 2 0 1 0 0
Generator Rm 3 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Fwd 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Aft 0 2 0 0
Converter Rm Aft 0 1 0 0
Repair 5 1 33 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Central 1 10 0 2
Oil Lab 0 1 0 1
Repair 2 0 24 0 0
Repair 3 (sec DCC) 1 30 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Fwd 0 6 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Aft 1 6 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 5 0 0
Emergency Issue 0 3 0 0




Different from CG SS
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches




APPENDIX I. CG (SS) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS 
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 4 12 2 2 1/12 augmented
Lookouts 0 3 0 1
Steering Aft 0 3 0 0
Signal Bridge 0 3 0 0
Operations Control
Air Control 0 3 0 2
Display and Decision 7 8 5 4
Surface/Subsurfaces 1 5 0 3
Tactical Information 0 8 0 7 Less one talker
CCSS 1 10 0 4
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 8 0 3
Information Security 0 4 0 1
Electronics Casualty Control
Combat Sys Maint Central 1 8 0 1
Computer Rm (SPY 1) 0 2 0 2
EW Equipment Rm 0 2 0 0
SPS 49 Radar Rm 0 3 0 0
SPS 55/Mk 99 Mod 4 xmtr Rm 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 1 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 2 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 3 0 3 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 4 0 2 0 0
Aegis Radar Rm 5 0 3 0 0
Radio xmtr Rm 0 4 0 0
CIC (SPY 1) 0 2 0 0
Sonar Repair (SQQ-89(v)6) 0 2 0 0
NIXIE Repair 0 1 0 0
Gun Repair 0 1 0 0
Weapons Control
MT 51 Loader Drum Rm 0 2 0 1
MT 51 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
MT 52 Loader Drum Rm 0 2 0 0
MT 52 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
Mk 41 VLS Launcher 0 5 0 1
Tomahawk 0 5 0 1
CIWS MT 1 0 5 0 0
CIWS MT 2 0 4 0 0
Harpoon Missile Sys 0 2 0 0
Total 14 147 7 33
Note:
Condition I Condition III
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
Different from CG SS  
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Control Station
ASW Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Sonar Control (SQQ 89(v)6) 0 6 0 4
Mk 32 SVTT enclosed 0 2 0 0
SQR-19 Control (SQQ 89) 0 1 0 0
Helo Control Station 1 0 0 0
Flight Deck Control 0 6 0 0 6/6 augmented
Ready Life Boat 0 9 0 0 9/9 augmented
RAST Control (LAMPS III) 1 0 0 0 1 LAMP OFF
Crash and Salvage 0 6 0 0 8/8 augmented
AFFF Generator Station 0 1 0 0
JP5 Pump Room 0 1 0 0 1/1 augmented
MIO
Boarding Team (co-manned) 0 15 0 0
Divert Team 0 9 0 0 5/9 augmented
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 1 0 4
ENG Rm Fwd 0 3 0 0
ENG Rm Aft 0 3 0 0
Aux Machinery Rm 1 0 3 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 2 0 1 0 0
Generator Rm 3 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Fwd 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Aft 0 2 0 0
Converter Rm Aft 0 1 0 0
Repair 5 1 32 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Central 1 4 0 1
Oil Lab 0 1 0 1
Repair 2 0 24 0 0
Repair 3 (sec DCC) 0 25 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Fwd 0 5 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Aft 1 5 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 5 0 0
Emergency Issue 0 3 0 0
Total 6 178 0 11
Overall Total
Note:
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
Different from CG SS





APPENDIX J. DDG BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS  
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 3 12 2 5
Lookouts 0 3 0 3
Steering Aft 0 3 0 0
Signal Bridge 0 6 0 2
Operations Control
Air Control 0 3 0 2
Display and Decision 6 8 3 7
Tactical Information 0 7 0 5
Surface Warfare 0 9 0 3
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 8 0 3
Information Security 0 3 0 1
Combat Systems Casualty Control
Combat Sys Maint Central 1 5 0 2
CIC 0 1 0 0
Electronics Workshop #1 0 3 0 1
Power Supply/Conversion 0 2 0 0
Radar Room #1 & #2 0 8 0 1
Radar Room #3 0 2 0 0
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #1 0 2 0 0
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #2 0 5 0 2
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #3 0 3 0 0
Radio Transmitter Rm 0 3 0 0
Communication Center 0 1 0 0
Sonar Equipment Rm #1 0 2 0 0
Harpoon Equipment Rm 0 5 0 0
Gun Repair 0 1 0 0
Weapons Control
MT 51 Loader Drum Rm 0 3 0 0
MT 51 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
CIWS MT 1 0 6 0 0
CIWS MT 2 0 5 0 0
MK 41 Launcher Station 0 8 0 2
Tomahawk 0 7 0 2
Total 10 142 5 41
Note:
Condition I Condition III
Different from DDG(OME)  
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Control Station
ASW Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Sonar Control (SQQ 89(v)6) 0 7 0 5
NIXIE 0 2 0 0
SQR-19 Control (SQQ 89) 0 1 0 0
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 3 0 3
ENG Rm Fwd 0 3 0 1
ENG Rm Aft 0 4 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 1 0 4 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 2 0 1 0 0
A/C Machinery and Pump Rm 0 1 0 0
Generator Rm 0 3 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Fwd 0 2 0 1
IC and Gyro Rm Aft 0 1 0 0
Repair 5 1 31 0 0
Repair 5 Unit A 0 21 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Central 1 9 0 2
Oil Lab 0 1 0 1
Repair 3 0 31 0 0
Repair 2 (sec DCC) 1 35 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Fwd 0 2 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Aft 1 2 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 5 0 0
Emergency Issue 0 3 0 0
Total 5 172 0 15
Overall Total
Note:





APPENDIX K. DDG (OME) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS  
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 4 10 2 2
Lookouts 0 3 0 1
Steering Aft 0 3 0 0
Signal Bridge 0 5 0 0  2/5 aug
Operations Control
Air Control 0 3 0 2
Display and Decision 6 8 3 7
Tactical Information 0 6 0 5
Surface Warfare 1 7 1 2
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 7 0 3
Information Security 0 4 0 1
Combat Systems Casualty Control
Combat Sys Maint Central 1 4 0 1
CIC 0 2 0 0
Electronics Workshop #1 0 2 0 3
Power Supply/Conversion 0 2 0 0
Radar Room #1 & #2 0 6 0 0
Radar Room #3 0 2 0 0
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #1 0 2 0 0
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #2 0 3 0 2
Combat Sys Equipment Rm #3 0 3 0 0
Radio Transmitter Rm 0 2 0 0
Communication Center 0 2 0 0
Sonar Equipment Rm #1 0 1 0 0
Harpoon Equipment Rm 0 4 0 0
Weapons Control
MT 51 Loader Drum Rm 0 3 0 1
MT 51 Handling Rm 0 8 0 0
CIWS MT 21 0 6 0 0
CIWS MT 22 0 5 0 0
MK 41 Launcher Station 0 4 0 1
M 60 Machine Gun #1 0 2 0 0 All aug
M 60 Machine Gun #2 0 2 0 0 All aug
25 MM Mount #1 0 2 0 0 All aug
25 MM Mount #2 0 2 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #1 0 2 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #2 0 2 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #3 0 2 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #4 0 2 0 0 All aug
Tomahawk 1 5 0 1
Total 13 138 6 32
Note:
Different from DDG
Condition I Condition III




ASW Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Sonar Control (SQQ 89(v)6) 0 5 0 4
NIXIE 0 1 0 0
SQR-19 Control (SQQ 89) 0 1 0 0
Helo Control Station 1 0 0 0
Flight Deck Control 0 6 0 0 All aug
JP5 Pump Room 0 1 0 0 All aug
Crash and Salvage 0 6 0 0 All aug
Ready Life Boat 0 9 0 0 All aug
MIO
Boarding Team 1 15 0 0
Divert Team 0 9 0 0 5/9 aug
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 2 0 4
ENG Rm Fwd 0 4 0 1
ENG Rm Aft 0 4 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 1 0 3 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 2 0 1 0 0
A/C Machinery and Pump Rm 0 1 0 0
Oil Test Lab 0 1 0 1
Generator Rm 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Fwd 0 2 0 0
IC and Gyro Rm Aft 0 1 0 0
Repair 5 1 32 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Central 1 9 0 2
Repair 3 0 25 0 0
Repair 2 (sec DCC) 1 30 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Fwd 0 6 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Main 0 6 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Aft 0 6 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 3 0 0
Emergency Issue 0 2 0 0
Total 6 193 0 14
Overall Total
Note:
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches




APPENDIX L. FFG BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS 
Control Station CI notes CIII notes
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 4 10 2 3 3 7 1 3 4/14 res 1/2 res
Lookouts 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1
Steering Aft 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
Signal Bridge 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1/2 aug res
Operations Control
CIC 3 14 1 7 1 9 1 3 7/17 res 4/7 res
Weapons CIC (MK 92 Mod 6) 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2/2 res 1 res
Electronic Warfare 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 1/3 res 1/1 res
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 6 0 2 0 6 0 2
Information Security 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 1/4 res
Combat Systems Casualty Control
Radar/IFF/CIC Equip Rm 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 1/5 res
Radio Central 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1/2 res
Combat Sys Maintenance Central 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 0 1/2 res All res
Air Nav/ECM Rm 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
NIXIE Equipment Rm 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
MK 92 Mod 6 Equipment Rm 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
Weapons Control
Gun Control 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2/3 res
76 MM Magazine 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2/3 res
CIWS MT 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 3/5 res
25 MM Mount #1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
25 MM Mount #2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
50 CAL Mount #6 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
M 60 Machine Gun #1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
M 60 Machine Gun #2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
40 MM Grenade Launcher 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All aug
Total 9 91 3 18 4 44 2 9
Note:
With Reserves Without Reserves
Condition I Condition III
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
Condition I Condition III
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Control Station CI notes CIII notes
ASW Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Sonar Control (SQQ 89(v)9) 0 6 0 3 0 3 0 0 3/6 res All res
SQR-19 Control (SQQ 89) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
Sonar Repair (SQQ 89(v)9) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
NIXIE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
Torpedo Launch Station 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 All res
Helo Control Station 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 All aug
Flight Deck Detail 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 All aug
Ready Life Boat 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 All aug
Boat davit crew 1 6 0 0 1 6 0 0 All aug
RAST Control (LAMPS III) 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 All aug
Crash and Salvage 0 12 0 0 0 12 0 0 All aug
AFFF Generator Station 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 All aug
JP5 Pump Room 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 All aug
MIO
Boarding Team (co-manned) 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 all res, all aug
Divert Team 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 all res, 5/9 aug
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 6 0 7 1 5 0 7 1/6 res
ENG Rm 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
Aux Machinery Rm 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
Aux Machinery Rm 2 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 1/4 res
Aux Machinery Rm 3 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
Switch Gear Rm 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Repair 5 1 26 0 0 1 24 0 0 2/26 res
Damage Control
Central Control Station 1 5 0 1 1 5 0 3
Repair 2 (Sec DCC) 0 24 0 0 0 23 0 0 1/24 res
Repair 3 0 24 0 0 0 23 0 0 1/24 res
Battle Dressing Station Fwd 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0
Battle Dressing Station Aft 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2/4 res
Emergency Issue 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1/3 res
Total 7 188 0 11 5 146 0 10
Overall Total
Note:
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
Without Reserves
Condition I Condition III
With Reserves
199 21295 32
Condition I Condition III
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APPENDIX M. MCM BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS 
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 3 8 1 2 2 5 2 7
Lookouts 0 2 0 1 0 5 0 5 3/5 aug
Signal Bridge 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operations Control
CIC 1 3 0 3 1 4 1 4
Mine Warfare
Sonar Control 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 5
MNV Launch and Recovery 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 1
Minesweep Launch and Recovery Area 0 0 0 0 1 17 0 0
Boat Vectoring Crew 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Boat Handling Detail 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 4 0 1 0 2 0 2
Electronics Casualty Control
Electronic Repair 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weapons Control
Gun Control 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
MT 501 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
MT 502 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 2 0 4 0 3 0 3
Main Engine Room 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1
Aux Machinery Rm 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
IC Room 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oil Lab 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Station 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair 2 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair 3 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0
Battle Dressing Station 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Emergency Issue 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 7 77 1 12 5 59 4 37
Overall Total
Note:
Augmented by off-watch or standing down other watches
64 41
Condition I Condition III
84 13
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APPENDIX N. MHC BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS  
Control Station
Ship Control Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted
Pilot House 2 6 1 4 2 3 2 4
Lookouts 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 5 3/5 augmented
Signal Bridge 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operations Control
CIC 1 2 0 2 1 5 1 6
Mine Warfare
Sonar Control 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 3
MNV Launch and Recovery 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0
Boat Vectoring Crew 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Boat Handling Detail 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
Communications Control
Radio Central 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 2
Weapons Control
Gun Control 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT 501 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
MT 502 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Engineering Control
Central Control Station 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 2
Main Engine Room 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aux Machinery Rm 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Damage Control
Damage Control Station 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repair 2 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support Control
Battle Messing 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Main Battle Dressing 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0




Condition I Condition III Condition IIM
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
161
APPENDIX O. NAVY ENLISTED RATE DESCRIPTION 
Boatswain’s Mate (BMs) train and supervise personnel 
in all activities relating to marlinspike, deck and boat 
seamanship, and the maintenance of the ship’s external 
structure and deck equipment. They act as petty officers in 
charge of small craft and may perform duties as master-at-
arms, serve in or take charge of gun crews and damage 
control parties. 
Cryptologic Technicians Technical (CTTs) control the 
flow of messages and information. Their work depends on 
technical communications by means other than Morse code and 
electronic countermeasures.   
Electronics Warfare Technician (EWs) operate and 
maintain electronic equipment used in navigation, target 
detection and location and for preventing electronic spying 
by enemies. They interpret incoming electronic signals to 
determine their source. EWs are advanced electronic 
technicians who do wiring, circuit testing and repair. They 
determine performance levels of electronic equipment, 
install new components, modify existing equipment and test, 
adjust and repair equipment cooling systems. 
The CTT and EW rates have been combined into the CTT 
rate. 
Damage Controlmen (DCs) perform the work necessary for 
damage control, ship stability, fire-fighting and chemical, 
biological and radiological (CBR) warfare defense. They 
instruct personnel in damage control and CBR defense and 
repair damage-control equipment and systems. 
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Electrician’s Mates (EMs) operate and repair the 
ship’s or station’s electrical power plant and electrical 
equipment. They also maintain and repair power and lighting 
circuits, distribution switchboards, generators, motors and 
other electrical equipment. 
Enginemen (ENs) keep internal combustion engines, 
diesel or gasoline in good order.  They also maintain 
refrigeration, air-conditioning, distilling-plant engines 
and compressors. 
Electronics Technicians (ETs) are responsible for 
electronic equipment used to send and receive messages, 
detect enemy planes and ships, and determine target 
distances. They must maintain, repair, calibrate, tune and 
adjust all electronic equipment used for communications, 
detection and tracking, recognition and identification, 
navigation and electronic countermeasures. 
Fire Controlmen (FCs) maintain the control mechanism 
used in weapons systems on combat ships. Complex 
electronic, electrical and hydraulic equipment is required 
to ensure the accuracy of Navy guided missile and surface 
gunfire-control systems. FCs are responsible for the 
operation, routine care and repair of this equipment, which 
includes radars, computers, weapons direction equipment, 
target designation systems, gyroscopes and range finders. 
It is in the advanced electronics field and requires a six-
year enlistment. 
Navy Gunner’s Mates (GMs) operate, maintain and repair 
all gunnery equipment, guided-missile launching systems, 
rocket launchers, guns, gun mounts, turrets, projectors and 
associated equipment. They make detailed casualty analyses 
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and repairs of electrical, electronic, hydraulic and 
mechanical systems. They also test and inspect ammunition, 
missiles and their ordnance components. GMs train and 
supervise personnel in the handling and stowage of 
ammunition, missiles and assigned ordnance equipment. 
Gas Turbine System Technicians (GSs) operate, repair 
and maintain gas turbine engines; main propulsion 
machinery, including gears; shafting and controllable pitch 
propellers; assigned auxiliary equipment propulsion control 
systems; electrical and electronic circuitry up to the 
printed circuit module; and alarm and warning circuitry. 
They also perform administrative tasks related to gas 
turbine propulsion system operation and maintenance, (GSE: 
Electrical) (GSM: Mechanical) 
Hull Maintenance Technicians (HTs) are responsible for 
maintaining ships’ hulls, fittings, piping systems and 
machinery. They install and maintain shipboard and shore 
based plumbing and piping systems. They also look after a 
vessel’s safety and survival equipment and perform many 
tasks related to damage control. 
Interior Communications Electricians (ICs) operate and 
repair electronic devices used in the ship’s interior 
communications systems, SITE TV systems, public address 
systems, electronic megaphones and other announcing 
equipment.  They are also responsible for the gyrocompass 
systems. 
Machinist’s Mates (MMs) are responsible for the 
continuous operation of the many engines, compressors and 
gears, refrigeration, air-conditioning, gas-operated 
equipment and other types of machinery afloat and ashore.  
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They are also responsible for the ship’s steam propulsion 
and auxiliary equipment and the outside (deck) machinery. 
MMs also may perform duties involving some industrial 
gases. 
Minemen (MNs) test, maintain, repair and overhaul 
mines and their components. They are responsible for 
assembling, testing, handling, issuing and delivering mines 
to the planting agent and for maintaining mine-handling and 
mine-laying equipment. 
Machinery Repairmen (MRs) are skilled machine tool 
operators. They make replacement parts and repair or 
overhaul a ship’s engine auxiliary equipment, such as 
evaporators, air compressors and pumps. They repair deck 
equipment, including winches and hoists, condensers and 
heat exchange devices.  Shipboard MRs frequently operate 
main propulsion machinery, besides performing machine shop 
and repair duties. 
Operations Specialists (OS) operate radar, navigation 
and communications equipment in shipboard combat 
information centers (CICs) or bridges. They detect and 
track ships, planes and missiles. They also operate and 
maintain identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, 
electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment and radio-
telephones. 
Quartermasters (QMs) assist the navigator and officer 
of the deck (OOD), steer the ship, take radar bearings and 
ranges, make depth soundings and celestial observations, 
plot courses and command small craft. Additionally, they 
maintain charts, navigational aids and oceanographic 
publications and records for the ship’s log. 
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Signalmen (SMs) send and receive various visual 
messages, handle and route message traffic, operate voice 
radio and repair visual signaling devices. They also render 
honors to ships and boats and serve as navigators. 
The QM and SM rates have been combined to be called 
bridge specialists.  No acronyms exist to represent this 
consolidation.  The QM rate is still in effect and will be 
used to fill bridge specialist requirements.  
Torpedoman’s Mates (TMs) maintain underwater explosive 
missiles, such as torpedoes and rockets, which are launched 
from surface ships, submarines and aircraft. They also 
maintain launching systems for underwater explosives, and 
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APPENDIX P. SEAFRAME BASELINE BATTLE BILL 
Type of Station BUSINESS AS USUAL CONDITION I
Control ID Watch station title Rate
Ship







Signal Bridge Signalman/recorder QM
recorder QM
Operations
Air Control AIC Supv OS
AIC OS
ASTAC OS
Display & Decision TAO OFF
Cbt Sys Coord FC
Missile Sys Supv FC
CIC Supv OS
GCCS-M Adminstrator OS





Engagement Radar Oper OS
DRT Oper OS
Weps Contrl Officer OFF
Weps Console Operator FC
Tactical Info Tactical Information Coord OS




Radio Central Radio Supervisor IT
Comm Sys Oper #1 SHIP
Comm Sys Oper #2 SHIP
Radio Oper SHIP
Talker SHIP
Information Security Network Security Tech IT
System Administrator IT
LAN Manager SHIP
Tactical Sys Administrator IT
Electronics Casualty Control
CS Maint Cntrl CSOOW OFF
CS Maint Supv FC




Search RADAR Electronics Repairman ET
Electronics Repairman ET
CIC Console Repairman FC
SONAR Repair Sonar Repairman STG
NIXIE Repair Torp Decoy Oper/Repairman STG
Gun Repair Gun Repairman GM  
Type of Station BUSINESS AS USUAL CONDITION I
Control ID Watch station title Rate
Weapons
MT 51 Loader Drum Rm TDT Supv GM
EP2 Panel Oper GM




RAM RAM Supv SHIP





50CAL #1 Gun Oper SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP
50CAL #2 Gun Oper SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP
50CAL #3 Gun Oper SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP
50CAL #4 Gun Oper SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP
SONAR Sonar Supv/UWS STG
SQS-53 Console Oper STG
SQS-53 Console Oper STG
SQQ-28 Console Oper STG
SIMAS Oper/Log Keeper STG
Torpedo CM Torp Tube Oper Port STG
Torp Tube Oper Stbd STG
Helo Control Station HCO OFF




Fuel station Oper SHIP
JP5 Nozzleman SHIP









Aircraft Handling RAST Oper OFF
Crash and Salvage Scene Leader DC
Hot Suitman ENG
Hot Suitman ENG
Hose Team Leader #2 ENG
AFFF Nozzleman ENG
AFFF Hoseman/plugman ENG
AFFF Station AFFF Station Oper ENG




Type of Station BUSINESS AS USUAL CONDITION I
Control ID Watch station title Rate
Engineering
CCS EOOW/Prop/DCO OFF
Prop Ctrl Sys Oper GS
Elec Plant Ctrl Cons Oper GS
ENG Rm Equip Monitor/Oper GS
Aux Machinery Rm Aux Oper/Rover EN
Equip Monitor/Oper EN
Damage
DC Central DCA OFF
Plotter DC
Talker SHIP
Oil Lab Oil/Water Tester EN




Investigator/SCBA Man #1 SHIP
Investigator/SCBA Man #2 SHIP
Nozzleman/SCBA Man #2 SHIP
Hoseman/SCBA Man #1 SHIP












AFFF Station Oper ENG
Battle Dressing Station Med Tech HM
Talker SHIP
Support
Battle Messing Ships Cook CS
Ships Cook CS
Ships Cook CS








































INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN IT
INFORMATION SYS TECH IT
INFORMATION SYS TECH IT




SHP ELX MTL OFF
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN ET
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN ET
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN (SONAR) STG




SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG
















































GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS







MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
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APPENDIX R. SEAFRAME RQMTS ANALYSIS 
Composite Technology Workload
LCS SEAFRAME SmartShip OME Sailor Leverage Alignment
Billet Title Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Executive Dept
COMMANDING OFFICER OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
YEOMAN YN YN YN YN YN YN
HOSPITAL CORPSMAN HM HM HM HM HM HM
Operations Dept
OPS AFLOAT GEN/SURF SFTY OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
IT PROFESSIONAL/COMMO OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
QUARTERMASTER QM QM QM
QUARTERMASTER QM QM QM QM
SIGNALMAN QM QM QM
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS a
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS OS OS
OPERATIONS SPECIALIST OS OS OS OS OS OS
BOATSWAIN'S MATE BM BM BM BM
BOATSWAIN'S MATE BM BM BM BM
BOATSWAIN'S MATE BM BM BM BM BM BM
BOATSWAIN'S MATE BM BM BM BM BM BM
BOATSWAIN'S MATE BM BM BM BM BM BM
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN CTT CTT CTT CTT CTT CTT
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN CTT CTT CTT CTT
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN CTT CTT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN IT IT
INFORMATION SYS TECH IT IT IT IT
INFORMATION SYS TECH IT IT IT IT IT IT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN IT IT IT IT IT IT  
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Composite Technology Workload
LCS SEAFRAME SmartShip OME Sailor Leverage Alignment
Billet Title Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Combat Systems Dept
CMBT SYS OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
GUN/ORD OFF OFF OFF
SHP ELX MTL OFF OFF
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN ET ET ET ET ET ET
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN ET ET ET ET ET ET
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN (SONAR) STG STG
ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN (SONAR) STG STG STG
IC ELECTRICIAN IC IC
IC ELECTRICIAN IC IC IC IC IC IC
IC ELECTRICIAN IC IC IC IC IC IC
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG STG STG STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG STG STG STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG STG STG STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG STG STG STG STG STG
SONAR TECH (SURFACE) STG STG STG STG STG STG
TORPEDOMAN'S MATE STG STG STG
TORPEDOMAN'S MATE STG STG STG
GUNNER'S MATE GM GM
GUNNER'S MATE GM GM GM GM GM
GUNNER'S MATE GM GM GM GM GM GM
GUNNER'S MATE GM GM GM GM GM GM
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC FC
FIRE CONTROLMAN FC FC FC FC FC FC




LCS SEAFRAME SmartShip OME Sailor Leverage Alignment
Billet Title Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Engineering Dept
SHP ENG GASTBN OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF
DC ASST OFF OFF OFF OFF
MPA GASTURBINE OFF OFF OFF
AUX MACH OFF OFF OFF
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM EM
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM EM
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM EM EM EM EM
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM EM EM EM EM EM
ELECTRICIAN'S MATE EM EM EM EM EM EM
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN EN EN
ENGINEMAN EN EN EN EN EN EN
HULL TECHNICIAN HT HT
HULL TECHNICIAN HT HT HT
HULL TECHNICIAN HT HT HT
MACHINERY REPAIRMAN MR MR MR
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC DC DC DC
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC DC DC DC
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC DC DC DC DC DC
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC DC DC DC DC DC
DAMAGE CONTROLMAN DC DC DC DC DC DC
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS GS GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS GS GS GS GS GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS GS GS GS GS GS  
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Composite Technology Workload
LCS SEAFRAME SmartShip OME Sailor Leverage Alignment
Billet Title Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
Supply Dept
STOREKEEPER SK SK SK SK
STOREKEEPER SK SK SK SK
STOREKEEPER SK SK SK SK SK
STOREKEEPER SK SK SK SK SK SK
STOREKEEPER SK SK SK SK SK SK
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS CS CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS CS CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS CS CS CS CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS CS CS CS CS CS  
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INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECH IT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECH IT
Combat Systems Dept





















GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH MECH GS
GAS TURB SYS TECH ELEC GS




MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST CS
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APPENDIX T. SEAFRAME REDUCED BATTLE BILL 
Type of REDUX CONDITION I CONDITION III
Control Watch station title Rate Rate







Weps Console oper FC
Tact Info Coord OS
EW Supv/Repairman CTT
Communications
Comm Sys Oper IT
Sys Admin/LAN Manager OS
Tactical Sys Admin IT
Electronics Casualty Control
CS Maint Supv ET
Electronics Repairman ET
Weapons
MT CAPT/EP2 Panel Oper GM GM
Ammo Passer/Gun Rep FC FC
MT CAPT/LCP Oper/Gun Rep GM GM
Ammo Passer/Gun Rep BM BM
Gun Oper SHIP SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP SHIP
Gun Oper SHIP SHIP
Gun Loader SHIP SHIP
Gun Oper SHIP SHIP
Gun Oper SHIP SHIP
Console Oper/SONAR Rep STG STG
Console Oper/SONAR Rep STG STG
Torp Tube Oper/NIXIE/SQR-19 Winch Oper BM BM
HCO/RAST Oper OFF OFF
Landing Safety Officer SHIP SHIP
FD Crewman SHIP SHIP
FD Crewman SHIP SHIP
JP5 Nozzleman SHIP SHIP
Coxswain/Engineer SHIP SHIP
Rescue Swimmer/ Bow Hook SHIP SHIP
Boat Deck POIC/Davit Oper SHIP SHIP
Line Handler SHIP SHIP
Line Handler SHIP SHIP
Scene Leader SHIP SHIP
Hot Suitman SHIP SHIP
Hot Suitman SHIP SHIP
Hose Team Leader SHIP SHIP
AFFF Nozzleman SHIP SHIP
AFFF Hoseman/plugman SHIP SHIP
Engineering
EOOW/Prop/DCO OFF EN/GS
Elec Plant Ctrl Cons Oper GS GS
Equip Monitor/Oper EN/GS EN/GS
Damage
DCA DC DC
Oil/Water Tester EN/GS EN/GS
Repair Party Leader DC DC
Investigator/SCBA Man #1 SHIP SHIP
Investigator/SCBA Man #2 SHIP SHIP
Nozzleman/SCBA Man SHIP SHIP
Hoseman/SCBA Man SHIP SHIP
Hoseman/SCBA Man SHIP SHIP




Stock Ctrl Supv SK
Locate/issue clerk SK
Total 59 59 45
Augment 21 21 41
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APPENDIX U. MODULE PRE-PACKAGED RQMTS 
Normal Reduced Normal Optimized Normal Optimized
FMP Executive
OIC/Analyst LCDR 1 1 1 1 1 1
AOIC/Analyst LT 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yeoman YN 1 1 1
Supply support SK 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comms Support IT 1 1 1 1 1 1
Operations Specialist MN/OS 1 1 1 1 1 1
USV Detachment
USV Oper BM 3 2 5 3 3 3
USV Maint EN 2 2 2
USV Maint EM 1 1 1
USV Maint ET 2 1 2 2 2 2
Weapons/Ordnance GM 2 1
RMV Detachment
RMV Oper MN 4 3 2 3
RMV Maint EN 3 3
RMV Maint STG 2 2 2 2
RMV Maint EM 1 1
BPAUV Detachment
BPAUV Oper/Maint MN 2 1
SCULPIN Detachment
SCULPIN Oper/Main MN 2 1
EOD Detachment
OIC/Dive Supv EOD 1 1
Diver EOD 1 1
Diver EOD 1 1
Stby Diver EOD 1 1
Diver Tender EOD 1
Diver Tender EOD 1
Stby Diver Tender EOD 1
Timekeeper/Recorder EOD 1
ACES/EER/IEER/AEER family Det
Oper/Maint STG 5 3
Torpedo CounterMeasures Det
Oper/Maint STG 3 1
ADS Det
Oper/Maint STG 5 2
Towed Array Det
Oper/Maint STG
Intermediate Cal Gun Det
POIC/Det Supv GM 1 1
Oper/Maint GM 3 3
Non-lethal Weapon Det
TBD TBD
TOTAL 32 36 19 37 21 20 15
Air Det 57 34 52 30 52 30
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APPENDIX V. MODULE FLEXED RQMTS COMPUTATION 
Seaframe MIW ASW SUW Total FMP
15 13 10 9 32
MIW ASW SUW Flexed
Reduced Reduced Reduced Total
FMP Executive
OIC/Analyst LCDR 1 1 1 32
AOIC/Analyst LT 1 1 1 32
Yeoman YN 0
Supply support SK 15
Comms Support IT 15
Operations Specialist MN/OS 1 15
USV Detachment
USV Oper BM 1 1 1 32
USV Maint EN 15
USV Maint EM 15
USV Maint ET 15
Weapons/Ordnance GM 1 9
RMV Detachment
RMV Oper MN 3 3 0 69
RMV Oper MN 0
RMV Maint EN 0 15
RMV Maint STG 0 30
BPAUV Detachment
BPAUV Oper/Maint MN 1 13
SCULPIN Detachment
SCULPIN Oper/Main MN 1 13
EOD Detachment
EOD Detachment EOD 4 52
ACES/EER/IEER/AEER family Det
Oper/Maint STG 0 3 0 30
Torpedo CounterMeasures Det
Oper/Maint STG 0 1 0 10
ADS Det
Oper/Maint STG 0 3 0 30
Towed Array Det
Oper/Maint STG 0 0 0 0
Intermediate Cal Gun Det
Oper/Maint GM 4 36
Non-lethal Weapon Det
TBD 0
Air Det Oper (specialists) 16 388
Air Det Support (generalists) 270
Module TOTAL without air det 19 21 15
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APPENDIX W. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AFFF  Aqueous Film Forming Foam 
AIC  Aircraft Intercept Control 
ASW  Anti-Submarine Warfare 
BM  Boatswain’s Mate 
BMOW  Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch 
CBM  Condition Based Maintenance 
CBT  Combat 
CCS  Central Control Station 
CG  Cruiser, Guided Missile 
CG (NS) Cruiser, Guided Missile (Pre-Smart Ship) 
CG (SS) Cruiser, Guided Missile (Post-Smart Ship) 
CIC  Combat Information Center 
CIWS  Close-In Weapon System 
CMP  Consolidated Maintenance Package 
CO  Commanding Officer 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
COMM  Communication 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS  Commercial off The Shelf 
CS  Culinary Specialist 
CS  Combat Systems 
CSO  Combat Systems Officer 
CSOOW Combat Systems Officer of the Watch 
CTT  Cryptologic Technicians, Technical 
DC  Damage Controlman 
DCA  Damage Control Assistant 
DCC  Damage Control Central 
DCC  Damage Control Console 
DCO  Damage Control Officer 
DCS  Damage Control System 
DDG  Destroyer, Guided Missile (Pre-FME) 
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DDG (OME) Destroyer, Guided Missile (Post-FME) 
DRT  Dead Reckoning Tracer 
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display Information System 
EM  Electrician’s Mate 
EN  Engineman 
ENG  Engineering 
EOOW  Engineering Officer of the Watch 
ET  Electronics Technician 
EW  Electronic Warfare Technician (now CTT) 
EXCEL® Microsoft Office XP EXCEL® program 
EXEC  Executive 
FC  Fire Controlman 
FFG  Frigate, Guided Missile 
FME  Fleet Manning Experiment (Refer to OME) 
FMP  Focused Mission Package 
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System - Maritime 
GM  Gunner’s Mate 
GSE  Gas Turbine System Technician, Electrical 
GSM  Gas Turbine System Technician, Mechanical 
HALON Halogenated Hydrocarbon  
HCO  Helicopter Control Officer 
HT  Hull Maintenance Technician 
IBS  Integrated Bridge System 
IC  Interior Communications Electrician 
ICAS  Integrated Condition Assessment System 
IT  Information Systems Technician 
JOOD  Junior Officer of the Deck 
JP5  Jet Petroleum (Aviation Fuel) 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LCP  Local Control Panel 
LCS  Littoral Combat Ship 
LSE  Landing Signalman, Enlisted 
MAINT Maintenance 
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MCM  Mine Counter-Measure 
MCS  Machinery Control System 
MHC  Mine Hunting, Coastal 
MIW  Mine Warfare 
MM  Machinist’s Mate 
MMC  Multi-Modal Consoles 
MN  Mineman 
MR  Machinery Repairman 
MT  Mount 
NAV  Navigator 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVMAC Navy Manpower Analysis Center 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NMRS  Navy Manpower Requirement System 
NO  Non-Optimal Manning Experiment 
NS  Non-Smart Ship 
OME  Optimal Manning Experiment (Type of FME) 
OOD  Officer of the Deck 
OPER  Operator 
OPS  Operations 
OPSO  Operations Officer 
OS  Operations Specialist 
PAPA  Personnel and Pay Ashore 
PMS  Planned Maintenance System 
POE  Projected Operational Environment 
POIC  Petty Officer in Charge 
PUK  Pack-Up Kit 
QM  Quartermaster or Bridge Specialist 
RADAR Radio Direction and Ranging 
RAM  Rolling Airframe Missile 
RAST  Recovery Assist, Securing and Traversing 
RCM  Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RCP  Remote Control Panel 
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REP  Repairman 
RQMTS Manpower Requirements 
RMS  Remote Mine-hunting System 
RMV  Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle 
ROC  Required Operational Capability 
SCC  Ship’s Control Console 
SH  Ship’s Serviceman 
SK  Storekeeper 
SM  Signalman (now QM or Bridge Specialist) 
SMD  Ship Manpower Document 
SONAR Sound Navigation and Ranging 
SQMD  Squadron Manpower Document 
SS  Smart Ship 
SUPV  Supervisor 
SUW  Surface Warfare 
TAO  Tactical Action Officer 
TDT  Target Designation System 
TM  Torpedoman’s Mate 
TORP  Torpedo 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USV  Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV  Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
UV  Unmanned Vehicle 
VMS  Voyage Management System 
VTUAV Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned   
   Aerial Vehicle 
WCC  Weapons Control Console 
WEPS  Weapons 
XO  Executive Officer  
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